FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Jamal Abdi, National Iranian American Council
Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association
Washington, DC – In a letter to President Obama, a group of twenty-four experts and former senior officials are calling on the White House “to direct your team vigorously to pursue serious, sustained negotiations with the Iranian government on an arrangement that guards against a nuclear-armed Iran.”
Statements from key government officials suggest the next round of P5+1 talks with Iran may resume within weeks.
“With greater determination, creativity, and persistence, we believe that such a deal is within reach,” the group writes. They urge the U.S. to secure more robust international inspections and limitations on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for a paring back of international sanctions. They write that direct negotiations are necessary to prevent war and prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon.
The group is comprised of former U.S. diplomats including Amb. James Dobbins, Amb. Chas Freeman, and Amb. Tom Pickering; former U.S. military and civilian officials including former Assistant Secretary of Defense Larry Korb, General Joseph Hoar, Lt. Gen. Robert Gard, Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, and Brig. General John Johns; former European diplomats and officials including Sir Richard Dalton and Amb. Rolf Ekeus; and Iran and nonproliferation experts.
The group warned that military action would have grave consequences for the U.S. and the region and, short of a full-scale occupation, would not stop Iran’s nuclear program. The group also warned that, while sanctions have greatly intensified, they were unlikely to stop Iran’s nuclear program and risk damaging the U.S. reputation among ordinary Iranians.
The overall goal for the United States, wrote the group, should be to halt Iran’s accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium; restrict–not suspend–Iran’s enrichment to normal reactor-grade levels; limit Iran’s stockpiles to nuclear power and other civilian, peaceful needs; and secure an agreement for enhanced IAEA inspections, including through implementation of the Additional Protocol.
Below is the letter text and full list of signatories. A PDF of the letter is available here.
December 6, 2012
The Honorable Barack H. Obama
Dear Mr. President:
Congratulations on your reelection as President of the United States. Over the course of your first term, you made clear your desire to resolve the Iranian nuclear issue diplomatically in order to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon and prevent war with Iran.
We strongly support this goal and, as you prepare to enter your second term, strongly encourage you to take immediate action to reengage in the direct multilateral and bilateral diplomacy with Iran necessary to achieve this goal. We are directing the same appeal to Iran. Time is of the essence, and we hope you will utilize the weeks and months ahead to pursue a robust diplomatic initiative.
A decade has elapsed since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that Iran was building a uranium-enrichment facility at Natanz. Since then, Iran and the United States and Western governments have missed several opportunities to reach an agreement that reduces the risk of a nuclear-armed Iran.
Today, Iran does not yet have the necessary ingredients for an effective nuclear arsenal, apparently has not resumed work on the actual construction of such a weapon, and may not yet have made a strategic decision to do so. But its capabilities are improving. By the end of 2013, Iran could install more-advanced centrifuges and significantly increase its 20% enriched-uranium stockpile. It continues work on a heavy water reactor at Arak and continues to expand the Fordow plant. The time available for diplomacy must not be wasted.
International sanctions have slowed Iran’s program and increased pressure on Tehran dramatically. Yet these sanctions, even if tightened further, are unlikely to stop Iran’s nuclear pursuits. Further, they risk damaging the reputation of the United States in the eyes of ordinary Iranians suffering from the effects of the sanctions.
The military option, short of a complete military occupation of the country, can only temporarily set back Iran’s program and could likely prompt Iran to eject the IAEA inspectors and actively pursue a nuclear weapon. Such action would be counterproductive and costly, and would risk ending a negotiation option, eroding sanctions, lessening Iran’s isolation and triggering a regional war that leads to enormous civilian casualties and human suffering.
Therefore, we encourage you to direct your team vigorously to pursue serious, sustained negotiations with the Iranian government on an arrangement that guards against a nuclear-armed Iran. With greater determination, creativity, and persistence, we believe that such a deal is within reach.
Overall goals for U.S. and P5+1 negotiators should include: halting Iran’s accumulation of 20 percent enriched uranium; restricting‹not permanently suspending–Iran’s enrichment to normal reactor-grade levels; limiting its stockpiles to actual nuclear power and other civilian, peaceful needs; and securing more extensive and effective IAEA inspections including through Iranian adherence to the Additional Protocol to the NPT and other inspection needs of the IAEA. Iran should account for previous weapons-related experiments to ensure that they have been halted. In exchange, there should be an appropriate and proportional paring back of international sanctions on Iran.
As a first step, we urge you and your team to pursue a revised proposal calling for a verifiable halt to Iran’s accumulation of 20 percent-enriched uranium including export of the material or conversion to metallic form in Iran in exchange for a reciprocal relaxing some of international and financial sanctions imposed on Iran. This would build confidence and momentum for a long-term framework agreement covering nuclear cooperation and security issues as well as a fully transparent future for Iran’s civil nuclear program in full and verified accordance with the NPT.
A diplomacy-centric approach is the only option that can prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon and a war, and address other equally critical areas including Iran’s human rights situation. Pursuing such a course is difficult, but it is the best option on the table.
We urge you to act.
Barry Blechman, co-founder of the Stimson Center
Prof. Juan Cole, University of Michigan
Sir Richard Dalton, Former UK Ambassador to Iran
Amb. James Dobbins, Former Assistant Secretary of State
Amb. Rolf Ekeus, Former Director of the United Nations Special Commission on Iraq
Prof. Farideh Farhi, University of Hawai’i at Manoa
Amb. Chas Freeman, Former U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia
Lt. General Robert G. Gard, Jr. Former President of National Defense University
General Joseph P. Hoar, Former Commander in Chief, United States Central Command
Amb. Steen Hohw-Christensen, Former Ambassador of Sweden to Iran
Amb. Peter Jenkins, Former Ambassador of the UK to the IAEA
Brig. General John Johns, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Daryl G. Kimball, Executive Director, Arms Control Association
Larry Korb, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense
Amb. John Limbert, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Iran
Amb. François Nicoullaud, Former Ambassador of France to Iran
Dr. Trita Parsi, President, National Iranian American Council
Bruno Pellaud, Former Deputy Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency
Amb. Thomas Pickering, Former Under Secretary of State
Paul Pillar, Former National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, Central Intelligence Agency
Amb. Roberto Toscano, Former Ambassador of Italy to Iran
Dr. Jim Walsh, Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Security Studies Program
Col. Larry Wilkerson, Former Chief of Staff to Gen. Colin Powell
Wayne White, Former Deputy Director of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence