Week of July 17, 2023 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council
- Are the Ershad Patrols Back on Iran’s Streets?
- Mohammad Khatami Raises Concerns About Ershad Patrol, Controversial Social Policies
- Resilience in the Face of Mandatory Hijab
- Oman’s Diplomatic Mission to Tehran Raises Hopes for Prisoner Exchange and Nuclear Agreement Progress
- Legislation Investigating Endowment Organizations
- Goharshad Mosque Endowment Allegedly Transferred to Ahmad Alam Al-Hoda
- Various Iranian Cities Witness Protest Rallies
- Iran’s Medical Community is Concerned about the Dismissal of Doctors
- Former Diplomats Warn of Russia and China’s Game with Iran’s Territorial Integrity
- The Renowned Iranian Author R. Etemadi has Passed Away
Following months in which state enforcement of mandatory hijab had all but subsided and “Morality Police” patrols had supposedly been eliminated, this week marked the apparent return of Islamic Republic patrols to police its dress code.
Several government officials had announced the end of the guidance patrols last December following the “Woman, Life, Freedom” movement, which was sparked by the killing of Mahsa Amini in the custody of the morality patrols. There was a noticeable decrease in the number of Ershad patrol cars on the streets of Iranian cities in the months that followed and it became increasingly commonplace for women to flout mandatory hijab in public places – though the state has continued to target many individuals for defying the law.
Last week, the spokesperson for Iran’s police force, Saeed Montazer al-Mahdi, announced the new deployment of police patrols in the streets beginning on Sunday, July 16 to address instances of clothing that has been deemed “unusual.” According to al-Mahdi, individuals who persistently violate established dress norms [mandatory hijab], regardless of the consequences, will be referred to the judicial system if they fail to comply with police orders.
Al-Mahdi said this action is being conducted as a response to “popular demands” from a variety of social groups and institutions, as well as the President’s and Judiciary’s directives. He claimed that patrols will be conducted within a legal framework with the goals of “enhancing public security and strengthening family foundations.”
Vans which resemble those utilized for Ershad patrols have appeared in the streets of Tehran in recent days, which have been photographed and circulated on social media. According to reports, a significant number of vans with police license plates but different colors were observed during this period, with their officers issuing warnings to women who failed to wear the hijab, leading to confrontations and tense situations. Khabar Online and Etemad Online have reported Ershad patrols on the streets again. Additionally, a widely circulated video emerged in which a cameraman claims that a girl on Geisha Street is calling for assistance during an encounter with a patrol.
However, Tasnim news agency, which is affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, claimed that the Gasht Ershad vans will not return to the streets, and vehicles with “Gasht Ershad” written on them will not be seen. There have been a number of questions regarding the implementation of this plan in online discussions. Tasnim’s reporter sought answers to these questions from police commanders. According to Tasnim news: “The Gasht Ershad vans will never return under any circumstances, and any videos or conflicts depicting their presence on the streets should be considered either fake footage or archived footage viewed for specific purposes.” When observed wearing “unusual clothing”, the “police car and foot patrols” that have already been seen on the streets will issue verbal warnings.
The Assembly of Teachers and Researchers of Qom Seminary criticized the return of patrols enforcing compulsory hijab in the streets, stating “These days, once again, we witness unreasonable and inhumane confrontations by the security forces with unveiled or improperly veiled women, which not only lacks any legal or religious justification but also undermines Islam and humanity.”
Amwaj Media, citing Iranian sources, noted that while some voices had indicated the decision was made by the Raisi administration, there appears to be an effort to deflect blame and responsibility. A police official told Etemad the decision was “implemented by the direct order of the president as head of the Supreme National Security Council” and that police were just following their orders.
Since the beginning of the revolution, the issue of mandatory hijab has been a source of deep controversy and conflict. In the early years of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini strongly supported the idea, whereas other clerics, such as Ayatollah Taleghani, initially opposed it. The first prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan, also opposed the mandatory hijab. Today, many reformists, including Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, oppose mandatory hijab. However, radical forces supporting Ayatollah Khamenei seek to enforce it fully.
Mohammad Khatami, the former President, has expressed his apprehensions regarding the escalating threat of “self-destruction” of Iran. Khatami highlighted these concerns while conferring with his advisers, highlighting the apparent resurgence of Ershad patrol operations, as well as the perplexing and unconventional decisions made by the police and security forces concerning women’s rights.
According to Khatami’s recent statement, the authorities must not only oppose such behaviors, approaches, and stances like returning the Ershad patrols, but also take decisive action against those who enforce these policies and those who perpetrate them. In light of the substantial societal costs associated with the past and the damage inflicted on the dignity of Islam, he urged officials to learn from them. There have been a variety of reactions to the announcement that the police plan to deploy additional patrols on the streets beginning Sunday, July 16, citing the need to enforce against “unusual coverage.” Earlier this year, Khatami made the point that chastity should not be conflated with hijab, asserting that the latter cannot be enforced by force.
Mahoor Ahmadi gave her speech without hijab at the funeral for her father, Ahmadreza Ahmadi. Ahmadi’s funeral ceremony was held at the Center for Intellectual Development of Children and Adolescents, honoring the prominent Iranian poet, author, and artist. Mahoor Ahmadi garnered significant attention as she defiantly refused to wear the mandatory hijab during her speech.
The Iranian journalist Yaghma Fashkhami shared on Twitter a photo of Mahoor Ahmadi, revealing that despite opposition from the center’s officials who attempted to prevent her from speaking at her father’s funeral, she insisted on speaking without the hijab. According to Mahoor, Ahmadreza Ahmadi’s poetry exhibited immense political depth despite the fact that he did not engage in politics. She also discussed her father’s forced retirement from the Center for Intellectual Development of Children and Adolescents.
In a separate incident, the actor Mohammad Sadeghi took to Instagram in a video to strongly criticize the treatment of women who choose not to wear the mandatory hijab. A day later, security officers arrested him for his actions. On Sunday, July 16, Mr. Sadeghi posted images of what appeared to be government agents assaulting him and forcing him from his house for arrest during a live broadcast on his Instagram page.
In another development, on July 19, the court refrained from considering a complaint filed by TV’s reporter Amenesadat Zabihpour against imprisoned human rights defender Sepideh Gholian on grounds of “hijab disobedience.” The court session was expected to be public but was canceled.
According to Gholian’s brother, Mehdi Gholian, Sepideh appeared to court at eight o’clock in the morning and refused to wear a headscarf during the court session. According to Judiciary News, “Despite providing the necessary platforms for holding the court session publicly and online, with the presence of the court president, prosecutor’s representative, and plaintiff’s representative, Sepideh Gholian did not meet the requirements for attending the public court, resulting in the decision of the judge to cancel the session.” According to her family, Sepideh was returned to Evin prison, where she is serving a 2-year sentence for “insulting the Supreme Leader”.
Movie actress Azadeh Samadi was also prohibited from engaging in online activities for a period of six months after resisting the mandatory hijab. Moreover, she was required to attend official psychological centers to receive treatment for what was referred to as “antisocial personality disorder.” She was instructed to submit her health certificate every two weeks after completing the treatment period.
The funeral ceremony of theater director Reza Haddad in May was documented by photographs which revealed Panthea Bahram and Azadeh Samadi without headscarves. In response, the Iranian Judiciary issued subpoenas regarding the mandatory hijab requirement, summoning individuals for trial in Tehran’s Court of Culture and Media on charges of “violating public morality and decency by uncovering the hijab.”
As an alternative to two months of imprisonment and one month of washing dead bodies in a Tehran mortuary, the head of Branch 104 of Varamin Criminal Court 2 sentenced a woman to pay approximately 3 million tomans in a similar case. According to the court verdict, shared on social media, the citizen was accused of “publicly unveiling her hijab while driving.”
Similarly, a female nurse in Ghom city was imprisoned and flogged for refusing to wear the mandatory hijab. It was decided that Maryam Banirezi would be sentenced to 10 days in prison and 74 lashes for “unveiling the hijab” along with 8 months in prison and 74 lashes for “disturbing public order.” She was further punished with 74 lashes for “violating public decency.” Separately, a female lawyer was reportedly barred from practicing law due to her refusal to wear the mandatory hijab.
As a form of protest, Afshana Baygan announced her retirement from acting after experiencing significant pressure. As a prominent star of Iranian cinema during the 1980s, she was considered a leading actress capable of portraying key roles in both film and television. She protested against the mandatory hijab nine months ago by appearing without a headscarf in nationwide demonstrations. Her participation in these protests exposed her, along with other female artists, to heightened security forces pressure. In recent weeks, Afsana Baygan, Azadeh Samadi, and Leila Blokat have been summoned for their headwear on television and face court cases. In light of the fact that wearing hats has long been a common practice among female actors, particularly in television series, this development is noteworthy. Additionally, Ketayoun Riahi and Panthea Bahram have been fined for “improperly revealing the hijab.”
The mounting pressure, frequent summonses, and legal actions taken against actresses who participated in the “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests by removing their mandatory hijabs have had significant consequences. In light of this, some actresses, such as Hengameh Ghaziani and Afshana Baygan, have decided to discontinue their involvement in the acting industry.
Amid Reported Complications Related to a “Fourth Prisoner”, Oman’s Diplomatic Mission to Tehran Raises Hopes for Prisoner Exchange and Nuclear Agreement Progress
Oman’s Foreign Minister, Seyyed Badr bin Hamad Albusaidi, embarked on a diplomatic mission to Tehran as a sign of possible negotiations regarding imprisoned dual-nationals and the nuclear program. Following a formal welcome ceremony, Albusaidi met with his Iranian counterpart, Hossein Amir Abdollahian.
Jake Sullivan, White House National Security Advisor, may have subtly hinted at the trip of Oman’s Foreign Minister to Tehran. According to Sullivan, efforts have consistently been made to secure the release of detained Americans since President Biden took office, even though a significant agreement with Iran may not be in sight.
Sullivan’s remarks heightened focus on the fate of “four prisoners.” As of yet, discussions around a prisoner exchange or release have focused primarily on three Iranian-American detainees: Siamak Namazi, Morad Tahbaz, and Emad Sharghi. According to Shargh newspaper, “the US in recent weeks had requested the release of a fourth prisoner, which stalled negotiations. However Iran may have broken the stalemate by agreeing to include the fourth prisoner in negotiations.” It is unclear who this fourth Iranian-American detainee is, though the Shargh newspaper previously identified him as Shahab Dalili, whose case has recently been reported in the American media. In April 2015, as he was returning to the United States, he was reportedly apprehended by agents of the Ministry of Intelligence.
Semafor is also reporting that the inclusion of a fourth individual in a swap is unlikely to further complicate negotiations. Quoting an individual close to one of the families of one of the individuals detained, they wrote “Multiple senior officials at the State Department in the last few weeks have privately emphasized the U.S. and Iran have already agreed the fourth American will be part of any deal and there are no delays being caused by [the person’s] inclusion.”
A spokesperson for the Iranian Foreign Ministry, Nasser Kanani, praised Oman as a valuable partner and emphasized Iran’s commitment to “ensuring the rights of its people through diplomatic means.” According to reports, Albusaidi carried a significant message from the US regarding the possible exchange of dual-national prisoners or efforts to deescalate the nuclear standoff. Oman is more likely to negotiate the release of dual nationals due to current political conditions.
Amir Abdollahian previously completed a diplomatic tour of four Persian Gulf countries, including Oman, in late June. During his travels, he discussed bilateral relations as well as global developments, with a special focus on negotiations. In addition, the Sultan of Oman, Haitham bin Tariq, made a diplomatic visit to Tehran, reportedly to spur a new round of indirect negotiations between Tehran and Washington.
Despite opposition from some influential institutions, Iran’s president is allegedly willing to release the fourth prisoner as part of a deal with the United States. Nasser Kanani confirmed that the issue of prisoner exchange remains on the agenda. Previously, John Kirby, spokesperson for the American National Security Council, admitted to discussions with Tehran regarding a prisoner exchange. Kirby stressed that negotiations were ongoing, but that no deal was expected to be imminent.
Representatives in parliament enacted a new law on July 18 aimed at reviewing the operations of endowment organizations. In this decision, the council members conducted extensive research and deliberated for a considerable amount of time. Out of a total of 209 representatives present during the meeting, the law was passed with 170 votes in favor, 18 votes against, and one abstention.
As part of this investigation, the council seeks to obtain a detailed report on the financial assets held in organizational bank accounts as part of a focus on the “allocation of endowments to specific individuals.” Prior investigations into these matters were subject to significant limitations due to the fact that institutions associated with Ayatollah Khamenei have historically been immune from scrutiny. While the investigation will not cover endowments managed by trustees such as Astan Ghods Razavi in Mashhad, Hazrat Masoumeh in Qom, Shah Cheragh in Shiraz, and other endowments affiliated with different organizations, a separate endowment linked to Khamenei will be.
“Organization of Awqaf and Charities” is a prominent government institution that manages various endowments in Iran. The head of this organization is appointed by Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Although it has a substantial amount of endowments in Iran, it does not control all of them. The organization primarily derives its revenue from donations and offerings.
Recent weeks have witnessed considerable public controversy regarding endowments provided to the family of the organization’s current leader, Mehdi Khamoshi. Mr. Khamoshi has held this position since 2018 under the directives of Mr. Khamenei. The head of the Awqaf Organization has stated that the institution is fully supervised by the General Inspection Organization. To date, the inspection organization has not provided any comments regarding this matter.
According to a recent disclosure, Mr. Khamoshi’s daughter-in-law has been leasing 150 hectares of land along with a livestock farm with 1,000 livestock from the endowment properties. Iranian media outlets have confirmed the lease agreement for the “Amini’s House” in Ghazvin, which has added to public outrage over the apparent corruption.
An anti-corruption activist, Vahid Ashtari, published documents concerning the well-known Aminiha House endowments leased to the daughter-in-law of the head of the Awqaf Organization. It was Ashtari’s contention that the monthly rent for these endowments was 900 thousand toman a month [around 20 dollars]. Every contract contains the official address of the Awqaf Organization’s head, according to the documents.
Citing Abolfazl Aminiha, the son of the trustee overseeing the historical Aminiha House endowments, the ILNA news agency reported that “it is true that several hundred hectares of endowments are being leased to the bride of Hujjatul Islam in Qazvin province for about 900 thousand tomans a month… When I came to work, I discovered that this lady was our tenant, but we were pressured not to address the issue.” It is believed that the Aminiha House, located on the western side of Molavi Street in Qazvin city, was built approximately 170 years ago by Mohammad Reza Amini, a renowned merchant and philanthropist during the period of Naser al-Din Shah Qajar. As a result, the property was dedicated to the care and support of the poor and needy.
Amini’s residence in Qazvin is not the only location in the controversy surrounding the illegal acquisition and transfer of endowment properties by officials of Iran’s Endowment Organization. Similar reports are frequently published in the media. When faced with allegations or suspicions of improper use of these properties, implicated officials often deny the media’s claims and threaten legal action against journalists.
Despite the repeated rhetoric of the authorities of the Islamic Republic about combating corruption, new instances of corruption emerge every day. In recent years, various radical factions, such as Iran’s current president, Ebrahim Raisi, and his father-in-law, Ahmad Alam Al-Hoda, have consistently positioned themselves as crusaders against corruption. In spite of this, a recent revelation further exposes the fallacy behind these assertions.
According to media activist Vahid Ashtari, the Goharshad Endowment, one of Mashhad’s largest endowments, has been handed over to Ahmed Alam Al-Hoda, the Friday imam appointed by Ali Khamenei, since 2016 And Raisi’s father in law. The significant financial benefits of the role have raised concerns of corruption. Taking to Twitter on Monday, July 10, Ashtari announced that the endowment includes over 1,000 hectares of land in Mashhad and 5,700 “sanddar fields” in Chenaran, Khorasan. Ashtari noted that, in accordance with the endowment document, 10% of the substantial income is allocated to “Mr. Alam Al-Hoda” as an administrative fee.
Additionally, Ashtari noted that after Alam Al-Hoda assumed trusteeship, he provided an account number belonging to himself at Bank Tejarat’s Lashkar Mashhad Crossroad Branch, where the trusteeship fee of 10% is deposited. Moreover, Alam Al-Hoda has delegated all financial, administrative, legal, and judicial matters to Khorasan Endowment. Ashtari further revealed that “the managers of the collections under the supervision of the leadership in each province are determined by the opinion of the representative of the jurist in that province.” Therefore, in 2016, the then-head of the Khorasan Endowment Department was replaced by Mohammad Jamshid Ahmadzadeh due to the positive opinion of Mr. Alam Al-Hoda.
Within a few months of assuming the position, Ashtari alleges that the new endowment manager granted the representative of the religious jurist one of the province’s largest endowments. Ashtari shared a picture of a power of attorney as part of his exposé which indicated that the individual who gave the properties to Alam Al-Hoda – Mohammad Jamshid Ahmadzadeh – received a separate 10% commission for for administering and executing the endowment.
According to Ashtari, the supervisor of these endowments has assumed the role of executor and contractor in an unusual manner. He also noted that, as per the endowment, 10% of the “huge income” generated by these endowments will be allocated as an administrative fee to Mr. Alam Al- Hoda.
In response to the news of the alleged transfer of Goharshad’s endowments, Ahmad Alam Alam Al-Hoda, stated that the trustee must be a Seyed [a man from the descendants of the Prophet of Islam] in Mashhad, and that he was granted this position by the legal authorities. Throughout this report, where the term “verification” is used instead of “handover,” Alam Al-Hoda dismisses the latter term as incorrect and asserts that he is a legitimate Shariah and legal guardian of the Islamic endowments. Although he has been allocated a 10% commission, he has chosen to remain silent on this matter.
Iranian social media reported a series of protest rallies on July 10 and 11 that took place in various Iranian cities. Dehloran, Saveh, Ahvaz, Mashhad, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Tehran, and Shiraz were among the places where demonstrations took place, capturing the nation’s attention. Dehloran Petrochemical Project workers gathered in front of the Special Governor’s office in Dehloran over the closure of the plant. There were similar protests in Kermanshah, Kurdistan, Fars, and Tehran, which resulted in the unemployment of approximately 2,000 workers.
Protests were organized outside telecommunications company buildings in Ahvaz, Mashhad, Kermanshah, Sanandaj, Shiraz, and Tehran in significant numbers. A number of retirees led these gatherings, expressing dissatisfaction with the lack of response to their concerns. Among the prominent issues raised were inadequate implementation of the 2010 personnel and employment regulations and unresolved challenges regarding health insurance.
Additionally, Harana reported on a demonstration in Saveh city, where aspiring homeowners gathered in front of the governor’s office seeking resolution to their housing issues. The widespread nature of these protests across multiple cities illustrates the ongoing discontent and frustration among a variety of segments of Iranian society. Individuals are expressing their concerns and demanding action.
According to Babak Zamani, a member of the Scientific Associations of Iran Medical Group, “more than a hundred doctors” have been terminated or forced into retirement over the past two weeks. Zamani stated in an interview with the “Hammihan” newspaper on Sunday July 16, that the majority of these doctors had signed statements prepared by medical associations to respond to recent events. In addition, several retired doctors have been prohibited from entering hospitals. Zamani highlighted the importance of board committees in appointing specialists by stating that some dismissed doctors were affiliated with three esteemed universities: “Shahid Beheshti, Medical Sciences, and Tehran.” A warning was issued by the Assembly of Scientific Associations of Iran’s Medical Group concerning the dismissal and exclusion of prominent professors.
Following the nationwide protests in 2022, a new wave of dismissals, reassignments, and forced retirements have been observed among university professors. Initially, this wave affected universities in the arts and humanities fields, but has now spread to medical science universities. According to the law, professors are permitted to serve on the academic faculty for up to 35 years. An “informed source” disclosed to Etemad newspaper that approximately a year and a half ago, a concerted effort began to remove independent and long-standing figures from university faculty lists and the medical education sector.
Etemad stated, “The Iranian medical community is deeply concerned about the shocking news pointing to a coordinated plan aimed at removing prominent professors from their positions while also forcing retirement or imposing restrictions on others.” Medical students have expressed their apprehension over the potential risks posed to patients’ lives and alienation of fellow citizens in need of medical care.
A statement was published by 71 former diplomats regarding Iran’s relations with Russia and China, just days after the Russian government expressed support for the positions of Arab countries on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf regarding the Iranian islands of Abu Musa. China also supported the position of Arab countries in the Persian Gulf in a similar manner last year.
Iranian ambassadors and diplomats, including Morteza Alviri, Morteza Bank, Mohsen Aminzadeh, Nosratollah Tajik, Hossein Mousavian, and Ali Khoram, expressed their concerns regarding the compromise of Iran’s territorial integrity by Russia and China. The statement said that the Islamic Revolution was the result of the free struggle of the Iranian people for independence, freedom, national sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Thus, the signers wrote, it is the duty of the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a political system based on popular votes, to protect Iran’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence, and security through all legitimate means.
The statement argues that both the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China have disregarded Iran’s national interests and compromised its territorial integrity for their regional interests and goals. Diplomacy requires that such unacceptable orientations be prevented in friendly relations between friendly nations as effectively and efficiently as possible. In spite of the fact that the Islamic Republic of Iran adheres to the constitution and laws that promote constructive engagement with all countries around the world, including the Russian Federation and China, the preservation of national interests, particularly Iran’s territorial integrity, should never be compromised with any country or political system.
The statement highlights that the shortcomings and imposition of unacceptable behaviors in geopolitical competitions, including actions that undermine Iran’s position and attack its national interests and territorial integrity, are due to the failure to adhere to the principles of the “neither East nor West” policy. By maintaining equilibrium in foreign relations and avoiding a one-sided perspective on the principle of deterrence in international relations, this policy promotes a balanced and development-oriented foreign policy.
Additionally, it emphasizes the need for a balanced and multifaceted foreign policy that considers Iranian geopolitical needs. In the absence of engagement with a broad range of centers and influential actors in regional and global developments, opportunistic nations seek one-sided benefits in bilateral and multilateral relations with Iran when they are reliant on a limited number of countries for international trade and balance. By engaging in such behavior, certain countries are able to treat the Islamic Republic of Iran as they see fit in regional and international arenas.
Furthermore, the statement emphasizes that power, security, and deterrence are constantly evolving and multifaceted in a global context that is rapidly changing. A country is considered powerful when it possesses diverse authority in politics, economy, technology, trade, soft power, and military capabilities, allowing it to play a significant role in global security and development indicators while influencing the interests of others for its own benefit.
Regardless of Iran’s geopolitical requirements, a single-sided orientalist approach, extreme anti-Westernism, and the denial of balanced relations can irreparably harm the country’s interests and impose significant costs, according to the statement. Instead, it reads, a balanced foreign policy that embraces realistic interaction with countries, refrains from biased positions that undermine national interests and the welfare of the Iranian people, and takes into account the current situation can lead to a smart foreign policy strategy in regional and global relations.
The beloved author of bestselling romance novels, R. Etemadi, passed away at the age of 90. According to Iranian media reports, Mehdi Rahimi, the publisher of Mr. Etamadi’s books confirmed that the acclaimed writer “passed away at 1:30 am yesterday (July 11) at his home after fighting illness for some time.”
Rajabali Etemadizadeh was born in 1933 in Lar in Fars province. He moved to Tehran with his family at the age of thirteen. Etemadi dedicated decades of his life to writing captivating stories, with his romantic novels becoming particularly popular. Aside from his success as a writer, Etemadi had a distinguished career as a journalist. He served as a journalist for several years and was the founding member and editor of a renowned youth magazine called “Youth Today.” This magazine, published by the Information Institute before the revolution, achieved remarkable success in the 1960s and 1970s.
Etemadi’s previous works became extremely sought-after second-hand items near Tehran University and El-Englab Square after he faced a publishing ban for more than a decade after the revolution. After a twelve-year hiatus, the Ministry of Education in 2000 granted him permission to publish new works, including his novel “Abi Eshgh,” along with the reprinting of his older works. It was, however, conditionally required that he publish the books under a different name. For the next two years, Rajab Ali Etemadi published his novels under the name Mehdi Etemadi.
His literary works include “Twist Make Me Hot,” “Sad Shoes of Love,” “A Moment on the Bridge,” “Iranian Night,” “Forty Degrees Under the Night,” and “Eight Minutes to Bareness.” However, in 1964, his second book, “Saken Mahaleh Gham,” which examined the lives of women in the “New City,” was banned. There are at least 28 romantic and social novels in Etemadi’s bibliography, 18 of which have been serialized in weekly and youth magazines. He published several unfinished works in the youth magazine, including “Kind Heads in Khak and Khes,” which explored the lives of several girls who lived in the aristocratic “Ashtarkadeh” area in northern Tehran. His published works include “Seven Sky of Love,” “Red Color of Love,” “Sad Sparrows,” “Game of Love,” “One Thousand and One Nights of Love,” and “Generation of Lovers.”Back to top