“When Trump first put in “maximum pressure” back in 2018…the runway from maximum pressure to an actual conflict was much much longer than it is today because of the regional dynamics,” since today, as Parsi noted, “you already have a region that is essentially on the brink of explosion.” Those remarks were given by Trita Parsi, Executive Vice President of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, in an X/Twitter Space panel exploring the likelihood that Trump and Iran genuinely can achieve a “Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement.”
The discussion, held on February 10, came shortly after both U.S. and Iranian leaders made headlines with important remarks on diplomacy. On February 4, 2025, Trump signed a memorandum reimposing his “maximum pressure” policies, but did so in a notably reluctant manner, stating that “hopefully it will be a document which won’t be very important and will hardly have to be used.” Following this, Trump stated on his Truth Social account that “I would much prefer a Verified Nuclear Peace Agreement, which will let Iran peacefully grow and prosper. We should start working on it immediately…”. However, on February 7, 2025, Supreme Leader Khamenei responded indirectly to Trump’s rhetoric and pressure, downplaying the possibility of talks but arguably not closing the door completely.
Parsi further raised concerns that, while Trump’s individual signals for diplomacy may be promising, it is certainly a possibility that he may not be able to deliver on it given conflicting views within his advisors, as played out in his first term. Moreover, he noted that even though Trump may focus on nuclear weapons, the memorandum went far beyond that, so there is no way for Iran to know that the U.S. wouldn’t seek to expand the scope of talks once Iran is at the negotiating table.
Barbara Slavin, Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center, then gave her view on Iranian perspective. Slavin noted that Trump, while talking a great deal about Iran policy, has yet to even appoint an Iran envoy, and argued that Iran may be waiting for Trump to make that important determination. Slavin asserted that the framework of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), under which Iran has been participating in meetings with the European members of the JCPOA’s joint commission, could also be seen as a framework for possible negotiations. She stated that “the Iranians seem to want to use that framework, while it still exists, to begin the process of talking about what comes next,” emphasizing that until a U.S. Envoy is named, it is a current roadblock in that process.
On the details of Trump’s “maximum pressure” policy, NIAC Policy Director Ryan Costello emphasized that while Trump’s reinstitution of “maximum pressure” is in some ways a continuation of the Biden policy that kept sanctions in place, there are some elements which go “beyond the Biden sanctions to potentially revoke any sanctions waivers that benefit the Iranian economy at all, potentially encompassing things like humanitarian items, food and medicine…”. He further underscored the memorandum’s aim to drive Iranian oil revenues down to zero as well as efforts with allies to snap back United Nations sanctions on Iran as additional pressure points, threatening to exacerbate tensions and drive Iran away from the negotiating table.
Meanwhile, the status of Iran’s nuclear program, in comparison to the last time Iran and the U.S. were operating under a diplomatic agreement, is drastically different today. Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy with the Arms Control Association, highlighted three fundamental differences in Iran’s nuclear program that have “brought it to the threshold of nuclear weapons”:
- Investment in enriched uranium stockpiles and advanced centrifuges, which would allow Iran to develop a nuclear weapon much faster if they ever make the decision to do so. The current advancement of these materials has made it so that Iran could produce five to six weapons in under two weeks, according to Davenport.
- Critical monitoring gaps that have emerged over the past few years due to Iran’s significant limiting of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors. Davenport noted that without full access to all of the facilities which support Iran’s nuclear program, the IAEA cannot verify that all of Iran’s nuclear activities are peaceful and that all the materials are accounted for.
- A shift in perspective on Iran’s nuclear doctrine – prominent Iranian lawmakers, according to Davenport, have stated that Iran may rethink its approach to its nuclear program should security conditions in the region change or Iran’s nuclear facilities be targeted.
In terms of U.S. leverage that could be utilized to secure a deal, Costello illustrated the possibility of the Trump administration lifting primary sanctions on Iran in order to allow U.S. businesses the opportunity to expand into the Iranian market, noting that back in 2015, “one of the key Trump complaints about the JCPOA was that it did not allow the U.S. and Iran to do (much) business.” Exchanging U.S. business opportunities for security concessions from Iran “could also go a long way to help normalize this notion of sanctions relief,” which have long impacted ordinary Iranians.
Zooming out to the wider region, the discussion shifted to exploring how the current ceasefire between Israel and Hamas plays a role in the ongoing dynamic between the U.S. and Iran. Slavin noted that with the ceasefire deal in a bit of a fragile state, its collapse could certainly impact Iran’s willingness to engage in talks with the U.S.
However, Parsi also emphasized that Iran’s recent regional setbacks via the fall of the Assad regime has made it so that the regional dimension is less of an issue in any potential U.S.-Iran negotiations. This can be corroborated by the fact that Trump has stated that his one “red line” when it comes to Iran is the acquisition of a nuclear weapon, indicating less interest in attempting to resolve regional issues through a narrowly-focused nuclear agreement.
Additionally, Slavin remarked that, should conflict arise within the region again, Iran’s willingness to negotiate could be significantly impacted, advising that “it is really imperative to start the exploratory talks whether it’s through the joint commission or through some private contacts while this lull in fighting is going on.”
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