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November 22, 2024

IAEA Adopts Censure Resolution on Iran, Iranian President’s First Provincial Visit Highlights Justice and Economic Promises, Iran’s Automobile Market Shocked by 33% Price Hike from Iran Khodro and Saipa, and More

Week of November 18, 2024 | Iran Unfiltered is a digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council 

IAEA Adopts Censure Resolution on Iran, Setting Stage for Possible Snapback Showdown Next Year

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors has adopted a censure resolution proposed by four Western powers condemning Iran for expanding its nuclear activities and failing to fully cooperate with the agency. This marks the second such resolution against Iran within the past six months. In the vote, 19 of the 35 member countries supported the resolution, while 12 abstained. Notably, two Permanent Members of the UN Security Council in Russia and China joined Burkina Faso in voting against it.

The resolution requests the IAEA Director General to present a comprehensive report on Iran’s nuclear activities and its lack of cooperation at the next Board of Governors meeting in March. Iran, which had warned of an immediate reaction if the resolution passed, responded within hours by announcing plans to activate “a substantial number of new and advanced centrifuges.”

Mohsen Naziri Asl, Iran’s ambassador to the United Nations offices in Vienna and the IAEA, reiterated Tehran’s commitment to its obligations as an IAEA member while signaling potential countermeasures. Speaking to reporters, he expressed disappointment at the resolution’s timing, particularly given recent visits by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi and the progress achieved during those meetings. “It is regrettable that this resolution was adopted despite constructive promises made during the Director General’s visit and our understanding with him,” Naziri said, adding that the resolution disregarded the agreements reached.

Grossi, in a press conference the day prior, had noted Iran had agreed to halt further accumulation of uranium enriched at the 60% threshold and described this as a tangible step toward addressing international concerns. However, it remains somewhat unclear whether this commitment was contingent on the IAEA Board of Governors abstaining from a censure resolution. In response to the resolution, Naziri emphasized that Iran’s actions would be grounded in its rights under international frameworks but assured that Iran would not resort to provocative measures and would maintain its cooperation with the IAEA.

Before the vote, Iran’s Foreign Minister made urgent calls to member states, urging them to oppose the resolution. Despite these efforts, the resolution was adopted, potentially paving the way for broader international sanctions. Earlier on Thursday November 21, the European powers involved—Britain, France, and Germany—had issued a statement urging Iran to not only halt high-level enrichment but also dismantle its stockpile of enriched uranium.

In a joint statement released shortly after the resolution’s adoption, Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Atomic Energy Organization criticized the Western countries for what they called a “politicized and destructive” move. The statement claimed that the resolution undermined the positive atmosphere created by Grossi’s visit and accused the Western powers of using Iran’s nuclear program as a pretext to pursue illegitimate goals. Iran also notified the IAEA Director General in advance about its potential countermeasures, which included activating advanced centrifuges. Despite this escalation, Tehran emphasized that technical cooperation with the agency would continue under existing safeguards agreements.

The resolution comes amid renewed uncertainty regarding diplomacy, with Iran signaling that such measures complicate the path to restoring a nuclear agreement. Ali Larijani, an advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, said that while Iran remains open to returning to the 2015 nuclear deal – known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) – it expects compensation for damages caused by the U.S. withdrawal from the deal. He also suggested that new negotiations could be possible if Washington accepted certain conditions.

The adoption of this resolution also may align with the broader strategy of the incoming Trump administration, which could pursue an escalation of the “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign. The resolution’s passage reflects a hardening stance by Western powers and raises concerns over potential activation of the “snapback” mechanism under the JCPOA, which could reimpose multilateral sanctions on Iran.

While the JCPOA has not been adhered to by any party for years following the 2018 U.S. withdrawal from the agreement, and subsequent Iranian countermeasures, certain pieces of the agreement arguably remain intact. The UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2231 in 2015 to effectuate the accord, and effectively replace pre-existing Security Council Resolutions against Iran. However, until October 2025, the option theoretically exists for parties to the JCPOA to trigger snapback – the return of the pre-existing Security Council resolutions that were enacted between 2006 and 2015. 

To trigger snapback, one of the parties would need to allege significant non-performance by Iran of its commitments, setting up a debate under the Security Council where the typical veto power is supposed to be reversed. Whereas typically a single Permanent Member of the Security Council could veto the adoption of a resolution, under the snapback provision a single Permanent Member is supposed to be able to restore the prior Security Council resolutions. However, this could run into significant challenges and infighting in the Security Council, as showcased by the Trump administration’s prior, failed efforts to snap back the resolutions while no longer a party to the JCPOA. Iran has options to respond to the threat of snapback, including by engaging in negotiations or possibly even withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

While some member states worried that the resolution might derail recent progress—such as Iran’s offer to halt 60% enrichment—Tehran now faces a tough road ahead as it seeks to resolve its nuclear file and push for sanctions relief. The unfolding developments suggest that while the resolution has escalated tensions, the diplomatic game is far from over. Tehran, for now, appears determined to continue navigating these challenges as it seeks to achieve its stated goal of lifting sanctions.

Iranian President’s First Provincial Visit Highlights Justice and Economic Promises

In his first provincial trip since taking office, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Sistan and Baluchestan with the slogan “Implementing Justice.” The trip included a notable meeting with Molavi Abdulhamid Ismaeelzahi, the Sunni Friday Prayer leader of Zahedan and a key supporter of recent protests.

Speaking in Zahedan, Pezeshkian emphasized the importance of local collaboration, pledging greater authority and resources to provincial officials. In response, Ismaeelzahi stressed the need for unity to ensure security and praised the president for appointing women, local figures, and religious minorities to government positions. During a meeting with regional clerics and tribal leaders, Pezeshkian acknowledged the province’s struggles despite its vast potential, stating, “The current state of Sistan and Baluchestan does not reflect its capabilities or the dignity of its loyal people. The government is committed to addressing these challenges with justice and fairness.”

Accompanying the president were several high-ranking officials, including vice presidents and ministers of transportation, education, industry, and energy. According to IRNA, the visit will implement 33 development projects across seven national agencies, with a total budget of 4,500 billion tomans ($150 million).

Ismaeelzahi, during a welcoming ceremony at Zahedan airport, called the visit “impactful” and said, “President Pezeshkian’s choice to prioritize this province and its hard-working, suffering people in his first trip is significant.” In a later meeting with intellectuals, he presented a letter urging the president to strengthen national unity, arguing that it would lower security costs and foster stability. “We know the president is open to dialogue; we ask that this openness increases,” Ismaeelzahi said. He also highlighted the country’s talent drain, lamenting that 10 million Iranian elites had emigrated and contributed their expertise to other nations. “These individuals are national assets, and we must find ways to bring them back,” he added.

In a notable development during the visit, Pezeshkian appointed Mahmoud Alavi, former intelligence minister under Hassan Rouhani, as his special adviser and head of the Council on Ethnicities, Religions, and Sects. The council, established in 2024 to enhance national unity and cooperation among diverse communities, aims to address long-standing ethnic and religious inequalities.

Pezeshkian’s campaign pledge to combat ethnic and religious discrimination remains a central theme of his presidency, underscored by his trip. Economic issues were also a focal point of the visit. Mohammad E’tabek, Minister of Industry, Mining, and Trade, announced new permits for “small-scale trade” benefiting porters and border traders. He added that Chabahar, previously excluded from such privileges, is now included.

The initiative, known as “tah-lenji,” provides customs duty exemptions for goods transported by sailors, a vital source of income for many. E’tabek noted that easing trade restrictions could significantly improve the livelihoods of border residents. During a visit to Mirjaveh market, E’tabek said, “Many barriers to exports and imports at border terminals have been removed within the government’s first 100 days. We aim to resolve remaining issues within the next three months.” He also referenced a new agreement with Pakistan to boost cross-border trade, signed during a recent visit to Islamabad.

The “tah-lenji” exemptions had been halted in late 2023 by the anti-smuggling task force, sparking widespread protests in towns like Genaveh and Chabahar. Reinstating these policies is seen as a key step toward easing tensions and improving economic conditions in the region. As Pezeshkian’s administration moves forward, the success of these initiatives will likely be scrutinized as a test of its ability to deliver on promises of justice and inclusion in one of Iran’s most marginalized provinces.

Sistan and Baluchestan was a major site of anti-government protests and brutal government repression in the 2022 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests. The “Bloody Friday” massacre in Zahedan – when security forces fired on unarmed protesters after the conclusion of Friday prayers, leading to approximately 100 killed – sparked regular protests against the government and frequent criticisms of the government’s harsh repression by Ismaeelzahi. Despite efforts to secure Ismaeelzahi’s endorsement during the campaign, Ismaeelzahi declined to explicitly endorse Pezeshkian. This makes his appearance with the new Iranian President during his visit to the province a notable development in the government’s efforts to smooth tensions in minority provinces following harsh repression.

Iran at a Crossroads: Negotiations or Escalation as Trump Era Nears

As Donald Trump’s presidency approaches, Tehran faces a critical dilemma: Should it engage in new negotiations with the United States or continue on its current path of tension and confrontation? The stakes are high, with warnings that escalating hostilities could lead to devastating consequences.

Officially, Tehran views Trump as a proponent of “maximum pressure”—a strategy of intense economic pressure that was first aimed at compelling Iran to scale back its nuclear program, curb the development of advanced weaponry, and end support for regional militias. In response, Iranian leadership has emphasized “maximum resistance,” signaling readiness to confront pressure with pressure.

Behind these public declarations, however, reports of backchannel communications, strategic media campaigns, and diplomatic maneuvering suggest that both sides are preparing for decisions that could define their relationship over the next four years. Within Iran, perceptions of Trump are shifting. While he was once dismissed with derogatory labels, some circles now describe him as a “deal-maker” or businessman who might be open to negotiation. This change reflects an ongoing internal debate among Iranian leaders as they weigh the risks and benefits of engaging directly with the incoming U.S. administration.

Unverified reports have fueled this speculation. Rumors of a meeting between Iranian Ambassador Amir Saeid Iravani and Elon Musk—a major Trump donor and advisor—in New York have intensified talk of a possible shift in Tehran’s strategy. Although the Iranian Foreign Ministry has denied these reports, these dismissals have only come from the Iranian side and many speculate that the meeting did, in fact, happen. 

Inside Iran, the debate over negotiating with Trump is intensifying. Reformist voices, including some former officials, argue that negotiations are a strategic necessity to prevent conflict and potentially ease sanctions. Abbas Akhoundi, a former minister, described Trump’s presidency as an “opportunity” for comprehensive talks that could stabilize relations with the U.S. and Gulf states. Others, like Ali Shakouri Rad, warn that avoiding negotiations might lead to war.

In contrast, conservative factions strongly oppose any rapprochement with Washington. Figures such as lawmaker Mohammad Saraj have cautioned the government against being swayed by “pro-Western politicians” advocating dialogue. Conservatives argue that Iran’s policy of resistance has preserved its regional influence and safeguarded its sovereignty.

Trump, meanwhile, shied away from broad demands of Iran on the campaign trail – emphasizing that his sole requirement for a deal with Iran is that it cannot possess a nuclear weapon. This outcome was assured by the 2015 nuclear deal that he reneged on, but with the JCPOA out of the picture the President-elect could have more flexibility to pursue his own deal. His first term was marked by very broad demands, as stipulated by his Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, including preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, curbing its missile program, and cutting support for the “axis of resistance’ in the Middle East. Some in the Trump orbit believe renewed sanctions and an updated “maximum pressure” campaign – backed by the threat of military force – can compel Tehran to meet these demands (or, so they say).

Iran’s leadership faces critical questions. Will it limit potential talks to nuclear issues, or will it address broader Western concerns, such as missile development and regional activities? And how can it manage internal divisions, where even cautious steps toward diplomacy risk alienating key domestic factions?

Reports of Elon Musk’s alleged involvement in U.S.-Iran relations have garnered significant attention. Iranian state media, both reformist and conservative, have offered divergent interpretations. Reformist outlets view the rumored meeting as a potential breakthrough, while conservative publications dismiss it as propaganda aimed at undermining Iran’s position.

Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister, emphasized that Iran is keeping the “door to negotiations” open. In an interview with the Financial Times, he warned that efforts to reimpose “maximum pressure” would fail. “Coercion and intimidation will not resolve the long-standing stalemate between Iran and the West over Tehran’s nuclear program,” he stated.

Takht-Ravanchi downplayed the potential impact of oil sanctions, asserting that any renewed efforts by the Trump administration to apply maximum pressure on oil markets would “undoubtedly fail.” He added, “No country can dictate conditions to the entire international community in today’s world.”

Ali Larijani, a senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, recently floated a pragmatic alternative. He suggested that while Iran would prefer the U.S. to return to the 2015 nuclear agreement (JCPOA) and compensate Iran for the economic losses caused by its withdrawal, a new deal could also be negotiated. He proposed that if the U.S. acknowledges Iran’s nuclear program and ensures it does not pursue weaponization, Tehran could engage in fresh talks under defined conditions.

As Tehran navigates these challenges, the coming months will reveal whether Iran opts for dialogue or confrontation, potentially reshaping its trajectory in response to Trump-era policies. Whatever path Tehran chooses will have far-reaching consequences for the region and the world.

EU and UK Impose Sanctions on Iranian Shipping and Aviation Sectors Over Alleged Support for Russia

The European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) have unveiled new sanctions targeting Iran’s shipping and aviation industries, citing their alleged role in supporting Russia’s military efforts in Ukraine. The measures, part of coordinated Western efforts, underscore rising tensions as the war in Ukraine continues to reshape global alliances.

The EU’s sanctions list includes the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and its CEO, Mohammadreza Khayabani. All 27 EU member states unanimously agreed to ban transactions involving ports and vessels linked to transporting drones, missiles, and related technologies from Iran to Russia. The sanctions specifically identify the Amirabad and Anzali ports for their involvement in facilitating the transfer of Iranian-made drones and missile components. Exceptions to these sanctions apply to emergencies concerning maritime safety, humanitarian needs, or situations threatening human health, security, or the environment.

In addition to Iranian entities, the EU imposed sanctions on three Russian shipping companies—MG Flot, VTS Broker, and Arapaks—accused of using the Caspian Sea to transport Iranian-made weaponry to Russian forces in Ukraine. The UK introduced complementary measures, blacklisting the Russian cargo vessel Port Olya 3. The UK’s sanctions include freezing the assets of Iran Air, previously accused of facilitating ballistic missile deliveries to Russia. London announced plans to suspend Iran Air flights to the UK within the next year, following earlier measures in September.

Tehran has consistently denied supplying drones or ballistic missiles to Russia for use in Ukraine. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmail Baghaei warned that any “inappropriate actions” targeting Iran’s economy would prompt a reciprocal response. Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi reinforced these statements, pointing to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky’s alleged acknowledgment that no Iranian ballistic missiles had been used by Russia on the battlefield.

Despite Iran’s denials, Ukraine claims that Russia has deployed over 8,060 Iranian-made Shahed drones since the start of the war, causing extensive damage and casualties. Germany has also raised concerns over China’s alleged support for Iran’s drone manufacturing capabilities. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock announced plans for additional sanctions targeting Iran’s regional and nuclear activities, while also addressing Beijing’s involvement in the Iranian drone industry.

In response to growing Western pressure, Iranian officials have emphasized their strong ties with China. Senior advisor to Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Akbar Velayati, recently met with China’s ambassador to Tehran, reaffirming long-term cooperation. China remains Iran’s largest trading partner and a significant buyer of its oil, despite international sanctions. Iran’s strategic relationships with China and Russia have deepened through its inclusion in international organizations such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. A 25-year strategic agreement signed between Iran and China in 2021 underscored their mutual hopes for growing economic and security ties.

Iran’s Automobile Market Shocked by 33% Price Hike from Iran Khodro and Saipa

Iranian car buyers faced an unprecedented shock last week as prices for vehicles from Iran Khodro and Saipa, two of the country’s leading automakers, skyrocketed overnight by up to 33%. The abrupt increases, announced without prior warning, have left citizens reeling, particularly those who had saved up for months—or even sold their current cars—hoping to upgrade or purchase a vehicle for work or family use.

Iran Khodro’s Prices increased by an average of 33%, or 147 million tomans per vehicle. Saipa’s prices rose by an average of 23%, or 77 million tomans per vehicle. Notably, the models affected include popular cars such as Saina, Quick, Atlas, and Shahin. These figures represent only the factory prices; additional costs for value-added tax, registration, insurance, and other legal fees could raise final prices by roughly 12%. Both Iran Khodro CEO Alimardan Azimi and Saipa CEO Seyed Javad Tousli-Mehr released official statements confirming these new prices, which were enacted in line with a directive from the Competition Council, responsible for overseeing market regulations for passenger vehicles.

The price hike was triggered by the release of new price lists from the automakers, showing factory price increases of around 30%. This announcement caused a ripple effect, pushing prices in the open market up by as much as 50%. Experts and consumers alike have reacted strongly, describing the increases as a heavy blow to an already struggling market. Buyers are now facing an added challenge, as the already inflated market becomes even more inaccessible.

Major price jumps of over 100 million tomans have been reported for many models, which has also stirred confusion on top of frustration among potential buyers. Once-affordable domestic vehicles are now priced in the billion-toman range, further alienating customers.

Assad Karami, head of the Tehran Auto Showroom and Dealers Union, told Mehr News Agency: “The mere rumor of price increases caused vehicle prices to rise by 5 to 10 million tomans in the past two days.” With the actual price hikes now confirmed, market instability has deepened.

The sharp price increases came after the government reportedly approved the automakers’ requests for adjustments. This decision followed a letter from the Automakers Association to Mohammad Reza Aref, Vice President of the Islamic Republic, seeking permission for significant price hikes.

The drastic increase has led to widespread criticism from economic experts and consumer advocates. Many argue that the decision exacerbates the affordability crisis in the automotive market, where high inflation and economic instability have already limited purchasing power.

Some critics labeled the move as shortsighted, warning that it will further deepen the recession in the car market and create challenges for buyers. “Raising prices at the factory level places an even heavier burden on consumers who are already struggling with rising living costs,” said one market analyst.

The shock of these price hikes is felt most acutely by individuals on tight budgets who were relying on marginal price differences to enter the market. One frustrated buyer remarked, “I sold my car hoping to upgrade, only to wake up and find out that the price of the car I wanted has gone up by a third overnight. It feels unfair.”

The increases have also led to calls for greater transparency and regulation to stabilize the market. However, with automakers citing rising production costs and inflation as justifications, a resolution seems unlikely in the short term.

The recent automobile price surge marks yet another chapter in the challenges facing Iran’s economy. As buyers grapple with soaring costs and limited options, the automotive industry stands at a crossroads, with its pricing policies under intense scrutiny. 

Delay in Iran’s Subsidy Payments Sparks Concerns Over Financial Strains

Iran’s targeted subsidy organization announced that cash subsidies for November 2024 (Aban 1403) will be deposited by the night of Thursday, November 21. This comes after a delay in payments for income groups in the fourth to ninth deciles, which are typically disbursed at the end of the Iranian month.

The delay, reported by Iranian media on Thursday morning, fueled speculation about financial shortfalls. By Thursday afternoon, the subsidy organization confirmed that payments were in progress. Tasnim News Agency, affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, suggested that the delay was due to unpaid funds from oil revenues and refinery operations to the national treasury. However, the subsidy organization denied a lack of resources, dismissing such reports as “media speculation.”

According to the Supreme Audit Court’s 2023 data, around 81 million Iranians receive subsidies. In the same period, 160,020 individuals were removed from the list of recipients, while 2,228,527 new applicants were added by the Ministry of Labor, Social Welfare, and Cooperatives.

Tayebeh Hosseini, spokesperson for the subsidy organization, reassured the public on November 21, stating that payments for the affected groups were underway and that updates would follow once finalized. She emphasized that no subsidies had been removed, aiming to alleviate concerns among low-income families.

The cash subsidy program, initiated during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s presidency under the “Subsidy Reform Law,” has long been a contentious economic policy. Subsidies for the fourth to ninth income deciles are typically paid monthly but were delayed this month, marking a first in the program’s history.

The delay has particularly impacted the approximately 51 million individuals in these deciles who rely on these funds to meet rising living costs. Media reports attribute the issue to a $700 million debt owed by the Ministry of Oil to the subsidy organization, highlighting broader financial mismanagement and strained intergovernmental coordination.

The delay also comes against a backdrop of economic stagnation and rising living costs, which have deepened poverty and increased reliance on government aid. Analysts warn that such mismanagement could exacerbate public discontent and further strain household budgets.

Some experts view the delay as a potential precursor to more significant changes, including reducing the number of subsidy recipients. They argue that this could be part of a broader strategy to address the government’s reported budget deficit of 850 trillion tomans (approximately $28 billion), as acknowledged by the Ministry of Economy.

The delay has also fueled speculation that the government may be laying the groundwork for restructuring all forms of subsidies, including cash transfers and energy subsidies. Proponents argue that reforms could help offset the fiscal deficit, but critics warn that such changes could disproportionately affect low-income households.

“This could be the government’s way of gradually preparing the public for subsidy reform,” said one analyst. “By tying cash subsidies to broader economic restructuring, the administration may be trying to gain public support for measures that could otherwise face resistance.”

As economic challenges persist, the delayed payment has raised questions about the sustainability of Iran’s subsidy program. For millions of low-income families, the uncertainty surrounding payments has added to growing anxieties about rising costs and economic instability.

Whether this delay signals deeper financial woes or the onset of major policy shifts, it underscores the pressing need for fiscal reform to address the government’s budgetary constraints while safeguarding vulnerable communities in an increasingly poverty-stricken Iran.

Narges Mohammadi Returns to Prison After Surgery Amid Critical Health Concerns

Narges Mohammadi, Nobel Peace Prize laureate and prominent human rights activist, has been returned to Evin Prison following surgery to remove a bone tumor from her leg, according to her lawyer, Mostafa Nili. Nili revealed on social media that Mohammadi underwent surgery last week to remove a tumor from her upper shin bone and to perform a bone graft. Despite her doctor’s recommendation for three months of specialized care in a suitable environment, Mohammadi was sent back to prison on Saturday, November 16.

“We have requested a medical leave and suspension of her sentence, considering her condition and the doctor’s advice,” Nili stated, adding that they are awaiting the judiciary’s decision. Two weeks ago, Nili disclosed that initial medical tests suggested Mohammadi might have cancer, while continuing to battle other health issues, including advanced arthritis, spinal disc problems, and digestive disorders.

Her family previously announced that Mohammadi was transferred to a hospital in Tehran after nine weeks of suffering from severe health complications. However, she was returned to prison shortly after her treatment. Taghi Rahmani, her husband, noted on Instagram that international pressure and advocacy by human rights activists were instrumental in securing her temporary hospital transfer.

Mohammadi’s family and civil rights activists have accused the Iranian government of negligence, claiming that her worsening health is a direct result of inadequate medical care during her imprisonment. They emphasize that Mohammadi urgently requires medical leave and proper treatment.

Since her arrest in November 2021, Mohammadi has been held in Evin Prison on political charges linked to her activism. Advocates argue that her case exemplifies the systemic targeting of human rights defenders in Iran and have reiterated their calls for her immediate release. The international community also continues to scrutinize the Iranian judiciary’s handling of Mohammadi’s case, as her health remains in a precarious state amid persistent calls for her freedom.

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