November 19, 2018 Comments are off NIAC
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Restoring U.S. Credibility: Returning to the Iran Nuclear Agreement

For a text version of this report, please click here.

NIAC JCPOA Report

Hear from experts who support re-entering the JCPOA:

Lawrence Wilkerson, Col, USA (Ret), former chief of staff to secretary of state Colin Powell:
“NIAC’s report, “Restoring U.S. Credibility – Returning to the Iran Nuclear Agreement”, is not only a powerful indictment of the Trump Administration’s security policy, it is a clear and clarion call for redress. The report makes quite clear that without a resumption of our agreed responsibilities under the JCPOA, alliances will fracture, de-dollarization movements will proceed apace, enemies will gain ground, and Iran will not be substantially prevented from acquiring a nuclear weapon. War could even result. The wonder is that the U.S. withdrew from the agreement in the first place; even more of a marvel–but entirely wise and proper–would be a successful return. Every concerned party should be working toward that end.”

Hooman Majd, Iranian-American writer:
“It almost goes without saying that the best option for de-escalating tensions in the Middle East, and preventing nuclear proliferation, is for the U.S. to return to the JCPOA nuclear accord. It is unimaginable that Iran would agree to a new deal—or indeed any other deal on other issues of contention—without the U.S. first abiding by the commitments that it made when it signed on, along with five other powers, to the nuclear deal with Iran.”

Ned Price, Director of Policy and Communication at National Security Action:
“There is much that we still don’t know about the Trump administration’s plans and intentions regarding Iran, but here’s what we do know: the withdrawal from the Iran deal was a political maneuver designed solely to satisfy the President’s base. It was manifestly not in our national security interest, as it has the potential to free Iran from the most stringent verification and monitoring regime ever negotiated, while also simultaneously setting us on a possible path toward another disastrous Middle Eastern conflict. What we also know, however, is that the new Democratic House now has the oversight tools to spotlight and constrain the administration’s recklessness, just as we begin to clear the path for the next administration’s reentry into the deal. There may be tactical disagreements regarding how to most effectively confront Iran’s destabilizing regional activities, but there must be a strategic recognition that only the JCPOA provides a baseline that allows us to achieve our most important objective: a nuclear weapons-free Iran.”

Barbara Slavin, Director of the Future of Iran Initiative at The Atlantic Council:
“I concur that the next US administration should return to the JCPOA– assuming Iran has remained compliant — and also lift the travel ban. The US should also request new talks with Iran both on repairing the damage from the unilateral withdrawal from the JCPOA and on other issues of mutual concern.

Narges Bajoghli, Assistant Professor at Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies:
“It is crucial for America’s standing in the world that we work to re-enter the JCPOA in the near future. This report provides concrete steps that Congress can take now to ensure that we return to the promises we made to the international community. Without doing so, America will continue to act as a force of instability in the Middle East.”

Farideh Farhi, Independent Scholar and Affiliate Graduate Faculty at the University of Hawai’i at Manoa:
“The Trump Administration’s ill-conceived rejection of the JCPOA and policy of ‘maximum pressure’ can no doubt inflict pain on the Iranian people. It can also court disaster in risking Iran’s resumption of its nuclear activities, further destabilization of the Middle East, and possibly even another costly US war in the region. Remaining quiet in the face of these predictable harms is not an option. This report offers timely and reasonable recommendations for keeping the JCPOA alive as a pathway for the re-emergence of a saner approach to Iran.”

Bijan Khajehpour, economist and a managing partner at Eurasian Nexus Partners:
“The US rejoining the JCPOA and helping to sustain a multilateral agreement will not only reduce the likelihood of an unnecessary nuclear arms race in the Middle East, but also prevent a radicalisation of Iranian politics. A moderate Iran is important for regional stability, the containment of jihadist movements and the future energy security for US allies globally.”

Nicholas Miller, Assistant Professor of Government at Dartmouth College
“The JCPOA has successfully curtailed Iran’s nuclear program and remains the surest tool for preventing an Iranian bomb. The new Congress should do what it can to limit the serious damage done by the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the deal. If the administration’s ‘maximum pressure’ campaign continues to escalate, the odds increase that Iran will exit the agreement and move closer to a nuclear weapon, which could in turn spark a costly war.”

Paul Pillar, Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Center for Security Studies at Georgetown University:
“Candidates and legislators of all political persuasions would do well to read and heed this report. The Trump administration’s abandonment of arms control and diplomacy in favor of conflict and confrontation has brought the United States only isolation and infamy as well as heightened risk of war. It is not too late to return to compliance with the JCPOA and to a course that demonstrably serves U.S. interests better than the current policy does.”

Ellie Geranmayeh, Deputy Head MENA program at The European Council on Foreign Relations
“President Trump’s decision to withdraw the US from the JCPOA, after months of negotiations with European allies earlier this year on pathways to sustain the agreement, was significantly damaging for transatlantic ties. This wound has been deepened by the manner in which the White House has sidelined European security interests and tried to impede their efforts to preserve the JCPOA, as enshrined by a UN Security Council. This report highlights the urgent need for the US executive and legislative branch to reassure European allies that in matters of foreign policy, the United States is a credible and consistent partner. Moreover, the US should reassure European capitals and companies that US sanctions policy will not seek to illegitimately target allies in pursuit of a maximalist policy that is unlikely to trigger fundamental changes in Iranian behaviour.”

November 1, 2018 Comments are off NIAC
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Sanctions Snapback: Trump Reverses Iranian Sanctions Relief

President Trump’s snapback of nuclear-related sanctions on Iran previously waived under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or Iran nuclear deal, will be finalized at midnight on Monday, November 5. While a portion of the sanctions previously waived under the JCPOA came back into force on August 7, the November 5 tranche of Iran sanctions includes many of the most impactful sanctions to be levied on Iran, including those targeting:

  • Iran’s port operators and shipping and shipbuilding sectors;
  • Petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and the National Iranian Tanker Company, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products from Iran;
  • Transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions;
  • The provision of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and certain Iranian financial institutions;
  • The provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; and
  • Iran’s energy sector.

In addition, the Trump administration will re-impose sanctions that applied to persons removed from OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) and other U.S. sanctions lists pursuant to U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. This includes, for instance, the re-imposition of sanctions on most of Iran’s financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran.

Blowback from Snapback

The snapback of sanctions on Iran has precipitated a crisis in slow motion, threatening a range of U.S. national interests and tying America closer to the destabilizing campaigns of Saudi Arabia. The blowback from sanctions reimposition will:

Increase the Risks of an Iranian Nuclear Weapon

  • Trump’s snapback of nuclear-related sanctions has eviscerated Iran’s benefit for complying with the JCPOA, increasing the risk of Iran halting its compliance with the accord and moving closer to a nuclear weapon.
  • The re-designation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) threatens to disrupt international work to reduce proliferation risks at the Arak heavy water reactor and deeply buried Fordow facility.

Raise the Risk of War

  • Trump’s advisors John Bolton and Mike Pompeo have pushed for war with Iran as an alternative to negotiations, as have Iran’s regional rivals who have increased sway with the Trump administration.
  • A spark for a military confrontation could come from several directions in the absence of diplomacy with Iran – whether over Iran’s nuclear program, regional tensions or a naval confrontation in the Persian Gulf.

Isolate the United States

  • The U.S. is in material breach of the UN Security Council-endorsed JCPOA, which all other parties to the accord – including our allies in Britain, France and the European Union (EU) – are seeking to keep alive.
  • JCPOA participants and Iran are seeking to establish independent payment channels, with ramifications that could undercut U.S. dominance of the global financial system and the power of U.S. secondary sanctions far into the future.

Raise Oil Prices

  • President Trump has repeatedly called on Saudi Arabia and Russia to pump more oil to offset Iranian oil that has been taken off the market, reducing spare capacity that could be key to respond to any emergency.
  • Iranian oil cannot be offset forever, and a crisis risks soaring oil prices and substantial harm for American consumers.

Increase U.S. reliance on Saudi Arabia

  • At a time when Saudi Arabia appears to be an increasingly unsavory partner for the U.S. after the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi, the Trump administration has pigeonholed itself into an approach to the Middle East that relies on Saudi Arabia.
  • Overlooking Saudi Arabia’s crimes to pressure Iran bears eerie resemblance to America’s early backing of Saddam Hussein throughout the Iran-Iraq war. A more balanced approach to the region is needed.

Undercut Moderate Forces in Iran

  • Trump’s Iran sanctions are likely to crush the Iranian middle class and private sector, unleashing economic desperation in the country and limiting prospects for internal moderation.
  • Iran’s hardliners have been vindicated by Trump’s decision to violate the JCPOA and snap back sanctions, and will benefit from sanctions that crush forces for moderation while leaving them relatively unscathed.

Trigger a Humanitarian Crisis in Iran

  • Sanctions on Iran under the Obama administration triggered shortages of key life-saving medicines and contributed to the impoverishment of ordinary Iranians by depressing the economy and increasing the cost of basic goods. Similar effects are already being felt from Trump’s snapback.
  • The Trump administration has already targeted private Iranian financial institutions that facilitated humanitarian transactions, raising the risk of further humanitarian crises in the months ahead and more damage to American credibility.
September 14, 2018 Comments are off Sina Toossi
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Iran Debates Going to the UNGA Amid Outcry Over Executions

Week of September 10, 2018 | Iran Unfiltered is a weekly digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council | Subscribe Here

  • Ayatollah Khamenei Doubles Down on Supporting Rouhani Administration
  • President Rouhani Blasts Trump and Blames him for Closing Diplomatic Doors
  • Syria Summit brings Russian and Turkish presidents to Tehran
  • Rancorous Debate over Rouhani Attending UNGA and Trump’s Iran-focused UNSC meeting
  • IRGC Missile attack on Kurdish targets Amid Controversial Executions that Spurs Strike
  • Iran Nuclear Chief Declares that Centrifuge Production Facility Completed

Developments this past week consequentially affected Iran’s foreign relations and the domestic balance of power between its political factions. While Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s continued support of President Hassan Rouhani has marginalized hardline elements in the official political landscape, Rouhani himself has continued his trajectory of adopting a more assertive and less conciliatory stance towards the US. On the foreign policy front, Iran hosted the Russian and Turkish presidents for a summit of the Astana-process Syria peace talks, while the Revolutionary Guards launched a missile attack on the base of an armed Iranian Kurdish opposition group in Iraq. The attack was coupled with the controversial executions of three Iranian Kurds, spurring businesses to shutter in Western Iran and claims that the executions were timed to undermine Rouhani’s trip to New York for the upcoming UN General Assembly.

 

Fallout from Threat on Rouhani, Renewed Supreme Leader Support

The controversy over a placard raised at an anti-Rouhani gathering in Qom’s Feyziyeh seminary—widely seen as threatening Rouhani’s life if he negotiates with the US—has led to the arrests of several involved in the incident. Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, chairman of the parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, said in a September 11th ISNA interview that four people were arrested in connection with the placard and are awaiting a legal trial.  

Hamid Rasaee, a prominent hardline cleric and former MP, blasted the arrests, accusing Rouhani of being insincere in his calls for unity and repeating the tacit threat. Rasaee proclaimed: “I am baffled by the level of hypocrisy Rouhani demonstrates. This morning he talked this way [about unity] at the Shahid Rajaee ceremony but in practice, for his political interests, he constructed a criminal case based on a slogan on a placard. I really hope that Farah’s pool will be your destination.”

During a September 6th address to members of the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Khamenei reiterated his support of the Rouhani administration and warned of a “propaganda war” being waged against the country. Ayatollah told the Assembly of Experts—an elected body of clerics constitutionally mandated to appoint and supervise the Supreme Leader—that criticisms of governing institutions are important but that “the way we speak and take action should not be in a way that makes people pessimistic.” He added: “The path to resolving current problems is not through turning our back on the [Rouhani] administration and acquitting ourselves from governing institutions, but rather through creating a healthy relationship between the public and governing institutions. Speaking and criticizing, but at the same time providing intellectual and practical support.”

Prominent reformist writer and analyst Ahmad Zeidabadi argued in a September 6th column that hardline principlists overreached and have become marginalized after Ayatollah Khamenei’s staunch expressions of support for Rouhani. Zeidabadi wrote that the Feyziyeh event “backfired and was met with fierce and unprecedented reactions from two senior clerics” and prompted hardliners to switch from “an aggressive stance to a defensive one.” He added: “Ayatollah Khamenei’s strong and explicit support of the Rouhani administration, especially his remarks at his recent meeting with the Assembly of Experts, shows that the decision of the system in the current climate is not to follow the adventurous and never-ending path of the hardline ‘principlists,’ but to continue the current status quo in the system.”

On September 8th, President Rouhani gave a far-reaching speech in which he stressed the importance of national unity and claimed that the Trump administration had on numerous occasions reached out for negotiations. Rouhani proclaimed: “They on one side impose pressure on the Iranian people and on the other side through various channels send messages asking for negotiations. In such a situation, should we just take their word? Should we take into consideration your messages or your sinister actions as demonstrating your intentions?” He also stated regarding his domestic critics: “Today is the day of a great national test. No one should think that they’ll gain popularity by speaking against the government [the administration], the public respects brave people who don’t turn their backs and abandon the government.”

Rouhani defended his more assertive rhetoric towards the US. He said in response to criticism that he has grown less conciliatory: “In peaceful conditions, if the enemy hadn’t entered the battlefield and America hadn’t unsheathed its sword, I would certainly be speaking differently. But today is the day of war with the enemy, and we all must stand side by side in solidarity and with one heart. Today, the parliament, the presidency, and the judiciary are standing together.”

Rouhani strongly rebuked the Trump White House. He gave a pointed message to the Trump administration: “If you’re telling the truth and care for the Iranian people, why do you want to impose pressure on the livelihoods of the Iranian people? If you believe that with pressure and your actions the Iranian people will take to the streets and raise their hands in submission and surrender to America and the White House, you are mistaken.” He added: “Are the Iranian people a people that will get afraid in the face of pressure from a new group of rulers in the White House, who themselves don’t know what they’re saying or doing and are fighting everybody?”

 

Syria Peace Talks Brings Russian and Turkish Presidents to Tehran

On September 7th, the presidents of Iran, Russia, and Turkey met in Tehran as part of the Astana-process Syria peace talks and released a 12-point statement on resolving the Syrian crisis. Before the Tehran summit, the three presidents met for Astana-process talks in Sochi, Russia in July 2018 and in Ankara, Turkey in April 2018. Rouhani declared at the summit that any political negotiations to resolve the Syrian crisis must safeguard Syria’s “territorial integrity and respect Syria’s independence.” He added that “America’s illegal presence and intervention in Syria has perpetuated insecurity in the country and must immediately end.” He further stated regarding the looming Idlib offensive: “The terrorists remaining [in Syria] have gathered in Idlib. These terrorists are engaging in provocative actions to use chemical weapons to end the ceasefire.”

Russian President Vladimir Putin commended cooperation between the three countries and stated their mutual aim was to eliminate terrorism in Syria. Putin stated: “Iran, Russia, and Turkey will actively continue their actions to eliminate terrorism to improve the humanitarian situation. We want to use the Astana process. The Astana process is a very appropriate way to revive the country of Syria.” He added that “our main goal is the destruction of terrorism in Syria” and that to date, “there have been 10 meetings of technical experts [within the Astana process] with participation from representatives of the three countries, the Syrian opposition, and representatives from the United Nations.”

While in Tehran, Turkish President Recep Tayeb Erdogan and President Putin also met separately with Ayatollah Khamenei. Ayatollah Khamenei said to Erdogan that “economic and political cooperation between the two countries must continue to grow,” adding that the US opposes this: “Unity and cooperation between Islamic nations will definitely lead to solving the region’s problems and for this reason, arrogant powers—of which America is at the forefront—are worried about cooperation between Islamic countries and the creation of an Islamic power.” Khamenei also stressed to the Turkish leader that “the Palestinian issue is forever important, and it shouldn’t be neglected for even a second.”

President Erdogan said to Ayatollah Khamenei that West’s actions are spurring greater cooperation between Islamic countries. He stated: “Given the way that the West is interacting with independent Islamic countries, conditions are more sensitive and this results in increasing the unique solidarity and brotherly ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey.”

In his meeting with Russian President Putin, Ayatollah Khamenei praised Iranian-Russian cooperation over Syria and called for the two sides to cooperate on containing America. Khamenei declared: “Cooperation between Iran and Russia on the Syrian issue is a great example and serves as a great experience of bilateral cooperation between the two countries which is truly mutually beneficial.” He added that the ” Americans have suffered a real defeat in Syria and did not reach their goals.” He further stated: “One area where the two sides can cooperate with one another is containing America, because America is a danger to humanity and containing it is feasible.”

Putin in his remarks to Khamenei stressed expanding economic and political ties. He stated: “In our meetings [with President Rouhani and Iranian officials] we have stressed expanding bilateral ties especially in the fields of economic and commercial cooperation.” He went on to describe mutual projects in the energy sector: ” In the field of energy, we have discussed constructing a new nuclear power plant and plants with lower capacity, as well as electrifying railways and increasing Iranian oil exports.”

Putin also stated that the US was committing a self-defeating mistake in sanctioning financial transactions and that Europe has no choice but to follow America’s lead on the JCPOA. He proclaimed: “The Americans are making a strategic mistake in creating limitations for financial transactions. For the price of a short-term political victory, they are deteriorating trust in the dollar internationally and weakening it.” He also said regarding Europe’s compliance with the JCPOA: “The Americans through misplaced actions destroyed the environment [that was created by the JCPOA] and the Europeans, because of their dependence on America in practical terms they follow America’s lead, despite their statements that they are seeking paths to preserve the JCPOA.”

 

Sharp Domestic Debate on Who Iran Should Send to the UNGA

The upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Trump White House’s decision to hold a special UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Iran on September 26th have elicited sharp debate in Tehran on what representatives Iran should send to New York. Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the conservative Kayhan, wrote on September 11th that Rouhani should not attend the UNGA. “Rouhani refraining from participating in the UNGA can be a teeth-breaking response to Trump’s ceaseless insults against Islamic Iran and our honorable people. At the same time, can we say that Rouhani’s previous trips to the UNGA resulted in any achievements that his non-participation now would negate?”

Shariatmadari’s column spurred a sharp rebuke from Hesamodin Ashna, a senior Rouhani advisor. Ashna proclaimed: “Even in street fights ‘ceaseless insults’ aren’t met with ‘refraining from being present.’ I don’t remember that during the episode of the previous president [Ahmadinejad] at Columbia University, that the Kayhan-ists expressed concern over the insults against him and Iran, or if they ever questioned what he achieved.”

Calls for Rouhani to not attend the UNGA have not been limited to conservatives but have been echoed by reformist figures such as Ata’ollah Mohajerani, who served as a minister in former president Mohammad Khatami’s administration. Mohajerani stated: “Given the threatening and humiliating tone of Trump, is it necessary for Rouhani to participate in the UNGA?” Mohajerani said that Rouhani should stay at home and prioritize domestic issues, opining: “Ayatollah Hashemi [former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani] never participated in the UNGA and Ahmadinejad went to every UNGA of his 8 years in office. Given the priority to address the economic, financial, and banking situation of the country kept Rouhani from meeting the Assembly of Experts, should it not also keep him from the UNGA?”

On September 10th, the foreign ministry denied rumors that there were differences between foreign minister Zarif and Rouhani and some in his office—namely chief of staff Mahmoud Vaezi—on whether Rouhani should attend the UNGA.

Conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, the head of the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts, warned against any U.S.-Iran negotiations at the UNGA. He declared: “Trump has a devilish aim to meet Rouhani at the sidelines of the UNGA. This is as the Supreme Leader has consistently said that no official has the right to negotiate with America, and the officials of the Rouhani administration that travel to New York should be cognizant of this.”

In a September 6th interview with the moderate Etemad, Qasem Mohebali, former director-general of political affairs of the Middle East in Iran’s Foreign Ministry, argued for Iran sending a representative to Trump’s UNSC meeting on Iran. Mohebali said Iran should wait and see if other world leaders would attend before Rouhani makes any decision on participating, and that if few leaders attended or if Trump was the sole head of state present, only Foreign Minister Zarif should attend. Mohebali said of the importance of Iran sending a representative to the UNSC meeting: “Because the subject of the meeting is Iran, Iran has the right to be present and must be present. Iran not participating will be to its detriment because the Americans want to maximize the anti-Iranian propaganda potential of this meeting and portray the Iranians as unwilling to talk.”

In a September 8th column, prominent reformist journalist Abbas Abdi wrote that now is not the time for Iran to engage in negotiations with the US. Abdi stated that Iran should only negotiate with the US when Washington shows in its actions, not its words, that it is ready for negotiations. He stated: “The start of any public and official negotiations should be based on agreements reached in non-official and backchannel negotiations … As such Trump’s suggestions for negotiations with Iran at the presidential level will not achieve results … Trump by leaving the JCPOA has shaken the very foundations of the concept of ‘agreement.'”

 

Missile Attacks on Kurdish Targets, Outcry over Executions of Three Iranian Kurds

On September 8th, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards launched a missile attack on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq, targeting a leadership meeting. In a statement, the Revolutionary Guards stated the strike was in response to a July 21st Kurdish separatist attack on a military outpost in Iranian border town of Marivan, which killed 11 Iranian soldiers. Seven surface-to-surface missiles, of the “Fateh” class, were fired “on a meeting of the leaders of the terrorists” in Koysinjaq in Iraqi Kurdistan, roughly 200km from the Iranian border. The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq said in response to strikes: “We condemn this attack, while we reaffirm our disapproval of using the Kurdistan Region’s territory for attacks against neighbouring countries.”

On September 8th, the same day as the IRGC missile attack in Iraqi Kurdistan, three Kurdish prisoners were executed inside Iran: Loqman Moradi, Zanyar Moradi, and Ramin Hossein Panahi. The three were accused of belonging to an Iraq-based separatist militant Kurdish group, Komala, and of participating in attacks in Western Iran that led to several deaths. The executions spurred outrage on Iranian social media and a strike by businesses in parts of Iranian Kurdish regions, amid reports that the executed were not given a fair trial and confessed under torture.

Loqman Moradi and Zanyar Moradi were arrested in 2009 and Ramin Hossein Panahi in 2017. The charges against Loqman Moradi and Zanyar Moradi, reportedly cousins, included carrying out an attack on July 5th, 2009 in the Iranian town of Marivan, which led to deaths of three individuals, including the son of the local Friday prayer leader. The charges against Ramin Hossein Panahi included entering Iran from Iraq on June 23rd, 2017, as part of an armed four-man team tasked with carrying out an attack. The charges state that the four-man team was held up by security personnel in the Iranian city of Sanandaj, triggering a violent confrontation in which grenades and gun fire was directed at the Iranian security personnel. The confrontation led to the deaths of the three other members of Panahi’s team and his capture, according to the charges.

Loqman Moradi, Zanyar Moradi, and Ramin Hossein Panahi all denied the charges against them. Panahi was sentenced to death last year by the Revolutionary Court of Sanandaj and rejected the charges against him. Loqman and Zanyar Moradi were sentenced death by Tehran’s Revolutionary Court. In a letter to the UN special human rights rapporteur for Iran they sent from prison five years ago, they proclaimed that their confessions were given under torture and that their integrators threatened to sexually assault them.

Saleh Nikbakht, the lawyer for Loqman and Zanyar Moradi, in a September 11th interview BBC Persian denied the accusations against his clients and said they were not given a fair trial. Nikbakht stated that the pair were executed even though their legal file was still open in the Tehran prosecutor’s office and there were multiple flaws in the case brought against them, including that their confessions were not written by them and that they were forced to sign them. He stated that Zanyar was not politically active at all while Loqman, who he says was arrested and held for six months for allegedly supporting Komala but released without charge, “had completely distanced himself from all political activities and worked in his father’s construction crane business.” Nikbakht added: “What is in the Tehran’s prosecutor’s statement is a lie and not real.”   

The executions spurred many businesses to close across Iranian Kurdish regions on Wednesday, September 12th, in protest. According to reformist website Zeitoons, the strike in Iranian Kurdish regions is more a reaction to public anger over the executions rather than due to calls by Kurdish parties, including separatist parties such as Komala, to strike as a response to the IRGC missiles strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan. Zeitoons stated: “These claims [of some Kurdish parties and their media] have been rejected by civil society activists inside the country. Looking holistically at social media and Farsi sites it seems that the sensitives are on the issue of the executions of the youngsters.”

Reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi, who shared time in prison with Loqman and Zanyar Moradi, wrote a deeply sympathetic note mourning their loss and suggesting the executions were timed to undermine President Rouhani’s upcoming trip to New York for the UNGA. Zeidabadi stated: “They were in prison for 10 years. Zanyar used to say that his grandmother had dreamed that he will be held for 10 years. So he believed after 10 years, he will be freed. He was freed but what a freedom.” He added: “But now on the verge of Rouhani’s and Zarif’s trip to the UN they are executed. What will be their answer when they are questioned by reporters? Will they respond that they do not know them? They have not heard their names? Will they say that the judiciary is independent and in these issues they can’t do anything? The reporters will laugh at these responses and Rouhani’s and Zarif’s arguments against sanctions and Trump will fall on deaf ears. Where is the expediency in executing them now after 10 years?”

 

Nuclear Chief Ali Akbar Salehi Says Iran Prepared to Ramp Up Nuclear Program

In a September 9th interview, Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said in an interview that Iran had completed construction of a new advanced facility for producing modern centrifuges, as per instructions from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in June. Salehi stated that Iran would respond “appropriately to any situation” regarding the JCPOA and make the “necessary decisions.” One such decision was to build a new facility for the construction of more efficient centrifuges.

Salehi stated that other decisions Iran could make include ceasing implementation of the Additional Protocol to its IAEA Safeguards Agreement and increasing the “scope and level of uranium enrichment.” He further stated: “The final scenario would be a full withdrawal from the JCPOA, which I am hopeful that, with the 4+1’s cooperation, will never occur because everyone will be harmed.”

In a separate interview with the Associated Press, Salehi said that the JCPOA could have led to an improvement in U.S.-Iran relations. He stated: “The withdrawal of the U.S. president from the nuclear deal has made him a loser in the eyes of history. This agreement could have opened the path to building the trust and confidence [in U.S.-Iran relations] that was lost.”

 


Below Please Find More Detailed Quotations and Translations:

On September 11th, Heshmatollah Falahatpisheh, chairman of the parliament’s national security and foreign policy committee, said in an interview with ISNA that members of the committee had travelled to Qom and met with senior Ayatollahs and Qom’s Provincial council and officials. He reported that four people at the Feyziyeh gathering behind the placard that implicitly threatened President Rouhani were arrested and that a legal case was being brought against them.  

Hamid Rasaee, a hardline cleric and former MP, blasted the arrests, accusing Rouhani of being insincere in his calls for unity. He also repeated the tacit threat:

  • Rasaee: “The president’s office and the Qom governorship have been the plaintiff in this case! I am baffled by the level of hypocrisy Rouhani demonstrates. This morning he talked this way [about unity] at the Shahid Rajaee ceremony but in practice, for his political interests, he constructed a criminal case based on a slogan on a placard. I really hope that Farah’s pool will be your destination.”

On September 6th, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei met with members of the Assembly of Experts—an elected body of clerics constitutionally mandated to appoint and supervise the Supreme Leader.

  • “Today the Islamic system is facing an all-out economic war which is being guided by a war room with total dedication and focus. But alongside this war, there is also a media and propaganda war being waged which is too often neglected.”
  • “Based on intelligence we have, the intelligence agencies of America and the Zionist regime, with financial support from the Qaroon wealthy countries (whose only purpose in life is to increase their wealth with no consideration for anybody else, especially the poor—referring to the Persian Gulf sheikhdoms) of our region, have created an infrastructure for this media war and they are pursuing this seriously and attempting to pollute the thinking and media environment of our society.”
  • “The goal of the propaganda war is to create anxiety, despair, hopelessness, and a sense that things are at a dead end and making people suspicious towards each other as well as towards governing institutions and exaggerating the perception of economic problems in society.”
  • “I am myself a critical person and do not hesitate to confront problems and governing institutions, but I stress that the way we speak and take action should not be in a way that makes people pessimistic.”
  • “The path to resolving current problems is not through turning our back on the Rouhani administration and acquitting ourselves from governing institutions, but rather through creating a healthy relationship between the public and governing institutions. Speaking and criticizing, but at the same time providing intellectual and practical support.”

On Friday, September 7th, reformist writer Ahmad Zeidabadi wrote that hardliners have overreached and weakened themselves in Iranian politics.

  • “Many analysts in the West viewed Trump’s withdrawal from the JCPOA from the angle that it would unprecedently empower hardliners in Tehran.”
  • “However, recent developments show that hardliners aren’t being empowered, but, to the contrary, they are experiencing a decline in their discourse at the official level and becoming politically isolated.”
  • “The beginning of this decline might have been the Feyziyeh event, which saw some hardliners attempting to ride on the wave of public economic grievances with the goal of drawing a redline against the Rouhani administration’s legitimacy and taking the initiative in the political arena.”
  • “However, the Feyziyeh event backfired and was met with fierce and unprecedented reactions from two senior clerics who support the political system.”
  • “This reaction took the hardliners from an aggressive stance to a defensive one, to the extent that they wanted to portray the whole issue as rising from a misunderstanding.”
  • “In this regard, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei’s strong and explicit support of the Rouhani administration, especially his remarks at his recent meeting with the Assembly of Experts, shows that the decision of the system in the current climate is not to follow the adventurous and never-ending path of the hardline ‘principlists,’ but to continue the current status quo in the system.”
  • “If the hardliners’ approach (on aggressive foreign policy & attacking Rouhani) is stifled, they won’t have anything to say and in this way they either have to join the moderate principlists or accept being quiet and marginalized.”
  • “The actions and positions of hardliners these days and comparing them to the comments of the Islamic Republic’s leader in his meeting with the members of the Assembly of Experts [which were starkly in contrast], reveals the reality of their position and stature in the official political space of the country.”

On September 8th, President Hassan Rouhani gave a far-reaching speech on domestic and foreign policy, defending his administration’s record. In the speech, Rouhani discussed the Iran-Iraq War and emphasized the importance of unity between political factions and the people during that period. He also sharply denounced the Trump administration’s Iran policy and claimed that U.S. had reached out multiple times for direct negotiations with Iran.

  • Rouhani in response to criticism that he has grown less conciliatory: “In peaceful conditions, if the enemy hadn’t entered the battlefield and America hadn’t unsheathed its sword, I would certainly be speaking differently. But today is the day of war with the enemy, and we all must stand side by side in solidarity and with one heart. Today, the parliament, the presidency, and the judiciary are standing together.”
  • Rouhani: “Today is the day of a great national test. No one should think that they’ll gain popularity by speaking against the government [the Rouhani administration], the public respects brave people who don’t turn their backs and abandon the government.”
  • Rouhani: “Are the Iranian people a people that will get afraid in the face of pressure from a new group of rulers at the White House, who themselves don’t know what they’re saying or doing and are fighting everybody?”
  • Rouhani: “The new group at the White House is not only clashing with the Islamic Republic of Iran but with its old and traditional allies and countries with whom it has deep economic ties with.”
  • Rouhani: “They on one side impose pressure on the Iranian people and on the other side through various channels send messages asking for negotiations. In such a situation, should we just take their word? Should we take into consideration your messages or your sinister actions as demonstrating your intentions?”
  • Rouhani to the Trump White House: “If you’re telling the truth and care for the Iranian people, why do you want to impose pressure on the livelihoods of the Iranian people? If you believe that with pressure and your actions the Iranian people will take to the streets and raise their hands in submission and surrender to America and the White House, you are mistaken.”

On September 7th, after their joint meeting in Tehran, the presidents of Iran, Turkey, and Russia released a 12-point joint statement on resolving the Syrian crisis.

  • The meeting was a part of the Astana-process Syria peace talks between the three countries, which has included ten meetings to date.
  • Before the Tehran summit, the three presidents met for Astana-process talks in Sochi, Russia in July 2018 and in Ankara, Turkey in April 2018.
  • During the Tehran summit, the three sides discussed “combating terrorists, how to support the legitimate government of Syria, delivering humanitarian aid, and finding a solution to the crisis.”
  • Rouhani stressed that any political negotiations to resolve the Syrian crisis must safeguard Syria’s “territorial integrity and respect Syria’s independence.”
  • Rouhani added: “America’s illegal presence and intervention in Syria has perpetuated insecurity in the country and must immediately end.” 
  • Rouhani: “The terrorists remaining [in Syria] have gathered in Idlib. These terrorists are engaging in provocative actions to use chemical weapons in order to end the ceasefire.”
  • Russian President Putin at the summit: “Iran, Russia, and Turkey will actively continue their actions to eliminate terrorism to improve the humanitarian situation. We want to use the Astana process. The Astana process is very a appropriate way to revive the country of Syria.”
  • Putin: “To date there have been 10 meetings of technical experts with participation from representatives of the three countries, the Syrian opposition, and representatives from the United Nations. Our main goal is the destruction of terrorism in Syria.”

 

On September 7th, Turkish President Recep Tayeb Erdogan and Russian President Vladimir Putin met separately with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei while in Tehran for the tripartite Astana-process Syria peace talks.

  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Erdogan: “Unity and cooperation between Islamic nations will definitely lead to solving the region’s problems and for this reason, arrogant powers—of which America is at the forefront—are worried about cooperation between Islamic countries and the creation of an Islamic power.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Erdogan: “The Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey are two respectable and powerful regional countries and have the same hopes for the region, as such political and economic cooperation between the two countries must continue to grow and reach new heights.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Erdogan: “The Palestinian issue is forever important, and it shouldn’t be neglected for even a second.”
  • President Erdogan to Ayatollah Khamenei: “Given the way that the West is interacting with independent Islamic countries, conditions are more sensitive and this results in increasing the unique solidarity and brotherly ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Putin: “Cooperation between Iran and Russia on the Syrian issue is a great example and serves as a great experience of bilateral cooperation between the two countries which is truly mutually beneficial.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Putin: “One area where the two sides can cooperate with one another is containing America, because America is a danger to humanity and containing it is feasible.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Putin: “The Americans have suffered a real defeat in Syria and did not reach their goals.”
  • Ayatollah Khamenei to Putin: “The Islamic Republic of Iran has until now abided by its commitments under the JCPOA but the Europeans have not abided by their responsibilities and it is unacceptable that we fully abide by our commitments and that the other side doesn’t implement its commitments.”
  • President Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei: “In our meetings [with President Rouhani and Iranian officials] we have tressed expanding bilateral ties especially in the fields of economic and commercial cooperation.”
  • President Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei: “In the field of energy, we have discussed constructing a new nuclear power plant and plants with lower capacity, as well as electrifying railways and increasing Iranian oil exports.”
  • President Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei: “The Americans are making a strategic mistake in creating limitations for financial transactions. For the price of a short-term political victory, they are deteriorating trust in the dollar internationally and weakening it.”
  • President Putin to Ayatollah Khamenei on the JCPOA: “The Americans through misplaced actions destroyed the environment [that was created by the JCPOA] and the Europeans, because of their dependence on America in practical terms they follow America’s lead, despite their statements that they are seeking paths to preserve the JCPOA.”

The upcoming UN General Assembly (UNGA) and the Trump White House’s decision to hold a special UN Security Council (UNSC) meeting on Iran on September 26th have elicited sharp debate in Tehran on what representatives Iran should send to New York.

  • On September 11th, Hossein Shariatmadari, the editor-in-chief of the conservative Kayhan, wrote that Rouhani should not attend the UNGA.
  • Shariatmadari stated: “Now is a good opportunity for our president in an official and public protest to Trump taking the presidency of the UNSC for this month, to not participate in the annual UNGA, so as to in this way humiliate Trump and to have at least responded to some of America’s insults against Iran and the Iranian people.”
  • Shariatmadari added: “Rouhani refraining from participating in the UNGA can be a teeth-breaking response to Trump’s ceaseless insults against Islamic Iran and our honorable people. At the same time, can we say that Rouhani’s previous trips to the UNGA resulted in any achievements that his non-participation now would negate?”
  • Shariatmadari’s column spurred a sharp rebuke from Hesamodin Ashna, a senior Rouhani advisor: Ashna exclaimed: “Even in street fights ‘ceaseless insults’ aren’t met with ‘refraining from being present.’ I don’t remember that during the episode of the previous president [Ahmadinejad] at Columbia University, that the Kayhan-ists expressed concern over the insults against him and Iran, or if they ever questioned what he achieved.”

Reformist figure Ata’ollah Mohajerani, who served as a minister in former president Mohammad Khatami’s administration, also suggested Rouhani not attend the UNGA. He stated: “Given the threatening and humiliating tone of Trump, is it necessary for Rouhani to participate in the UNGA?”

  • Mohajerani added: “Ayatollah Hashemi [former Iranian president Hashemi Rafsanjani] never participated in the UNGA and Ahmadinejad went to every UNGA of his 8 years in office. Given the priority to address the economic, financial, and banking situation of the country kept Rouhani from meeting the Assembly of Experts, should it not also keep him from the UNGA?”

On September 10th, the foreign ministry denied rumors that there were differences between foreign minister Zarif and Rouhani and some in his office—namely chief of staff Mahmoud Vaezi—on whether Rouhani should attend the UNGA.

  • Fararu notes that Iranian officials have recently stated that during last year’s UNGA, the Trump administration through eight different channels communicated a desire for Trump to meet Rouhani. Rouhani also recently stated that every two weeks, the U.S. sends messages asking for negotiations.

Conservative Ayatollah Ahmad Janati, the head of the Guardian Council and Assembly of Experts, warned of a potential Rouhani-Trump meeting: “Trump has a devilish aim to meet Rouhani at the sidelines of the UNGA. This is as the Supreme Leader has consistently said that no official has the right to negotiate with America, and the officials of the Rouhani administration that travel to New York should be cognizant of this.”

In a September 6th interview with the moderate Etemad, Qasem Mohebali, former director-general of political affairs of the Middle East in Iran’s Foreign Ministry, argued for Iran sending a representative to Trump’s UNSC meeting on Iran.

  • Mohebali: “Because the subject of the meeting is Iran, Iran has the right to be present and must be present. Iran not participating will be to its detriment because the Americans want to maximize the anti-Iranian propaganda potential of this meeting and portray the Iranians as unwilling to talk.”
  • Mohebali: “Given the principle of equal representation, we must see that other than Trump, which presidents will participate in the meeting. If important leaders participate it is appropriate that President Rouhani himself is present in the meeting. But if few leaders participate and it’s just Trump, Zarif alone can attend.”

On September 8th, prominent reformist journalist Abbas Abdi wrote a column arguing that now is not the time for Iran to engage in negotiations with the United States. Abdi argued that Iran should only diplomatically engage the United States if Washington proves in its actions, not its words, that it is ready for negotiations.

  • Abdi: “The start of any public and official negotiations should be based on agreements reached in non-official and backchannel negotiations … As such Trump’s suggestions for negotiations with Iran at the presidential level will not achieve results … Trump by leaving the JCPOA has shaken the very foundations of the concept of ‘agreement.'”

On September 8th, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards launched a missile attack on the headquarters of the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Iraq, targeting a leadership meeting:

  • According to an IRGC statement, seven surface-to-surface missiles were fired “on a meeting of the leaders of the terrorists” in Koysinjaq in Iraqi Kurdistan, roughly 200km from the Iranian border.
  • Conservative Mashregh wrote the missile strikes came “precisely at the time when the leaders and main heads of the terrorist Kurdistan Democratic Party group were meeting. Specific intelligence regarding the time of the meeting and its locations were possessed by the Revolutionary Guards.”
  • Conservative Fars News wrote that the missiles used in the strike were of Iran’s “Fateh” class of missiles.
  • The Revolutionary Guards said the attack was in response to a July 21st attack on a military outpost in Iranian border town of Marivan, which killed 11 Iranian soldiers.
  • The Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq said in response to the missile attack: “We condemn this attack, while we reaffirm our disapproval of using the Kurdistan Region’s territory for attacks against neighbouring countries.”

On September 8th, the same day as the IRGC missile attack in Iraqi Kurdistan, three Kurdish prisoners were executed inside Iran: Loqman Moradi, Zanyar Moradi, and Ramin Hossein Panahi. The three were accused of belonging to an Iraq-based separatist militant Kurdish group, Komala, and of participating in attacks in Western Iran that led to several deaths. The executions spurred outrage on Iranian social media and a strike by businesses in parts of Iranian Kurdish regions, amid reports that the executed were not given a fair trial and confessed under torture.

  • The charges against Loqman Moradi and Zanyar Moradi, reportedly cousins, included carrying out an attack on July 5th, 2009 in the Iranian town of Marivan, which led to deaths of three individuals, including the son of the local Friday prayer leader.
  • The charges against Ramin Hossein Panahi included entering Iran from Iraq on June 23rd, 2017, as part of an armed four-man team tasked with carrying out an attack. The charges state that the four-man team was held up by security personnel in the Iranian city of Sanandaj, triggering a violent confrontation in which grenades and gun fire was directed at the Iranian security personnel. The confrontation led to the deaths of the three other members of Panahi’s team and his capture, according to the charges.
  • Panahi was sentenced to death last year by the Revolutionary Court of Sanandaj and rejected the charges against him.
  • Loqman and Zanyar Moradi were sentenced death by Tehran’s Revolutionary Court. In a letter to the UN special human rights rapporteur for Iran they sent from prison five years ago, they proclaimed that their confessions were given under torture and that their integrators threatened to sexually assault them.

Saleh Nikbakht, the lawyer for Loqman and Zanyar Moradi, in a September 11th interview BBC Persian denied the accusations against his clients and said they were not given a fair trial.

  • Nikbakht: “Zanyar was not politically active at all. His father was politically active but he himself was not. Loqman was arrested for six months on charges of supporting Komala, which did not result in him even being charged. After six months, he had completely distanced himself from all political activities and worked in his father’s construction crane business. What is in the Tehran’s prosecutor’s statement is a lie and not real.”   
  • Nikbakht stated that the pair were executed even though their legal file was still open in the Tehran prosecutor’s office and there were multiple flaws in the case brought against them, including that their confessions were not written by them and that they were forced to sign them.

The executions spurred many businesses to close across Iranian Kurdish regions on Wednesday, September 12th, in protest.

  • According to reformist website Zeitoons, the strike in Iranian Kurdish region is more a reaction to public anger over the executions rather than due to calls by Kurdish parties, including separatists parties such as Komala, to strike as a response to the IRGC missiles strikes in Iraqi Kurdistan.
  • Zeitoons stated: “These claims [of some Kurdish parties and their media] have been rejected by civil society activists inside the country. Looking holistically at social media and Farsi sites it seems that the sensitives are on the issue of the executions of the youngsters.”   

On September 8th, reformist journalist Ahmad Zeidabadi, who shared time in prison with Loqman and Zanyar Moradi, wrote a deeply sympathetic note mourning their loss and suggesting the executions were timed to undermine President Rouhani’s upcoming trip to New York for the UNGA.

  • Zeidabadi: “They were in prison for 10 years. Zanyar used to say that his grandmother had dreamed that he will be held for 10 years. So he believed after 10 years, he will be freed. He was freed but what a freedom.”
  • Zeidabadi: “Their lawyer said that their case was no longer a national security one, so they hoped their case will be resolved.”
  • Zeidabdi: “But now on the verge of Rouhani’s and Zarif’s trip to the UN they are executed. What will be their answer when they are questioned by reporters? Will they respond that they do not know them? They have not heard their names? Will they say that the judiciary is independent and in these issues they can’t do anything? The reporters will laugh at these responses and Rouhani’s and Zarif’s arguments against sanctions and Trump will fall on deaf ears. Where is the expediency in executing them now after 10 years?”

On September 9th, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization, said in an interview that Iran had completed construction of a new advanced facility for producing modern centrifuges, as per instructions from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei in June.

  • Salehi also stated that if the JCPOA “is ended,” Iran will likely cease implementing the Additional Protocol to its IAEA safeguards agreement.
  • Salehi stated that Iran would respond “appropriately to any situation” regarding the JCPOA and make the “necessary decisions.” One such decision was to build a new facility for the construction of more efficient centrifuges.
  • Another action, Salehi said, could be to stop implementation certain limitations of the JCPOA, such as “the scope and level of uranium enrichment.”
  • Salehi added: “The final scenario would be a full withdrawal from the JCPOA, which I am hopeful that, with the 4+1’s cooperation, will never occur because everyone will be harmed.”

On September 11th, Salehi also had an interview with the Associated Press, where he reiterated that he hoped the JCPOA will continue, but that Iran was prepared to jumpstart its nuclear program.

  • Salehi also stated: “The withdrawal of the U.S. president from the nuclear deal has made him a loser in the eyes of history. This agreement could have opened the path to building the trust and confidence [in U.S.-Iran relations] that was lost.”

 

 

 
September 6, 2018 Comments are off Sina Toossi
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Contentious Politics on the Rise as Iran’s Political Factions Try to Make Gains

Week of September 3, 2018 | Iran Unfiltered is a weekly digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council | Subscribe Here

  • Embattled Rouhani emerges unscathed from parliamentary questioning
  • Prominent activists and students given hefty sentences, parliamentarians push for clemency
  • Unprecedented rebukes of political and economic conditions by female parliamentarians
  • Foreign Minister Zarif faces accusations in parliament of abetting “soft regime change” efforts orchestrated by George Soros, the International Crisis Group, NIAC, and others
  • Green Movement leader Mehdi Karroubi writes a letter to the Assembly of Experts from house arrest, calling on them to hold Ayatollah Khamenei to account
  • Ayatollah Khamenei reiterates support for Rouhani, appoints new Revolutionary Guards navy commander, and dismisses potential for war

The past two weeks in Iran have seen increased politicking by the country’s various factions and centers of power. President Hassan Rouhani, who has seen two of his ministers impeached by parliament in the past month, was himself questioned by parliament, triggering speculation that his hold on office is growing precarious. Meanwhile, Green movement opposition leader Mehdi Karroubi and prominent female parliamentarian Parvaneh Salahshouri both issued rare challenges to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei. Foreign Minister Javad Zarif also faced far-fetched accusations from a hardline MP, while several activists were given hefty sentences—spurring widespread outrage and calls for clemency.

 

Continued Threats Against Rouhani’s Life

A prominent principlist religious eulogist reiterated an implicit threat against Rouhani’s life if he returns to negotiating with the United States. On August 21st, Mansour Arzi, affiliated with the fundamentalist Jebhe Paydari faction that organized a controversial Qom rally where a placard threatening Rouhani was raised, repeated the threat at a public religious ceremony in Tehran. The reformist Arman newspaper underscored that Arzi’s remarks came after senior religious leaders condemned the initial Qom gathering and stressed that the “ideology” behind such gatherings and slogans “needs to be identified.”

Meanwhile, a senior figure in Iran’s seminary system downplayed the threat and opined that most of the seminary was against Rouhani’s policies, including on negotiations. Mohammad-Hassan Nabavi, a deputy for propagation and practical training in the national seminaries, said that the placard was a “huge mistake” but questioned whether it could “really be interpreted that we will kill the president.” Nabavi stated: “I don’t get this from these words at all. Instead, it meant that whoever pursues negotiations, they might suffer problems.” He added that most in the seminary disapprove of the Rouhani administration’s policies on the economy and negotiations.

 

Activists Arrested, Outspoken MPs Decry Political & Economic Conditions

Parisa Rafiee, a 21-year-old arts student at the University of Tehran was sentenced to 7 years in prison and Reza Khandan, husband of imprisoned lawyer and human rights activist Nasrin Sotoudeh, was arrested. Rafiee’s lawyer said she was arrested in March and charged with “colluding to commit crimes against the country’s security, propagandizing against the state, and disturbing public order.” He said he would appeal the charges and suggested that military institutions intervened in her case. Meanwhile, Khandan was arrested 10 days after his wife, Sotoudeh, started a hunger strike. Soutedeh was arrested on June 23rd, after months of representing several women arrested in the anti-compulsory hijab protests of this past spring.

Fatemeh Saeedi, a Tehran MP, met with a senior judiciary official and wrote a letter to other senior officials regarding the case of Parisa Rafiee and other imprisoned activists, and expects a positive response. Saeedi discussed the cases of “prisoners such as environmental activists, students, and especially women prisoners” and said she was hopeful that an “ideal resolution” would be reached. Mohammad Reza Farahani, deputy minister for culture and students in the ministry of science, also said at a press conference that six of the fourteen medical science students arrested in the late December/early January protests have been exonerated. Two have been sentenced, however, and the files of the other six have yet to be addressed by the courts.

Two female MPs, Parvaneh Salahshouri and Hajar Chenarani delivered blistering critiques before the parliament on the political and economic climate. Reformist Tehran MP Salashouri explicitly directed her comments towards Ayatollah Khamenei and called for a referendum on issues such as “foreign policy, the management of state TV, and the Guardian Council’s stewarding of elections for parliament and the assembly of experts.” She also highlighted issues such as “the imprisonment of students, teachers, laborers, lawyers, and environment activists, the entrance of military forces in the fields of politics, economics, and culture” as major crises facing the Islamic Republic.

 

Rouhani Questioned by Parliament, Keeps Supreme Leader Support

President Rouhani was questioned before parliament on August 28th. The MPs were not satisfied with his answers to four of their five questions, which triggered a process to send the questions to the judiciary. The questions were on five issue areas: smuggling, sanctions, unemployment, economic recession, and the Rial’s depreciation. The MPs had 30 minutes to ask the questions and Rouhani had one hour to respond. In his responses, Rouhani stressed that Iran’s main challenge was the Iranian peoples’ lack of hope for the future. He proclaimed: “The key is that we have to explain to the people that these problems will be overcome with the guidance of the Leader, and coordination between the three branches and the armed forces.”

The episode represented the second time in the Islamic Republic’s history that a president was questioned before parliament, the first was Ahmadinejad in 2012. Parliamentary rules were changed after MPs judged Ahmadinejad as not taking the process seriously. The new rules, which were in effect for Rouhani, required any questions that a majority of MPs present were dissatisfied over the president’s answers to be sent to the judiciary. The judiciary would then investigate the matter and it could potentially lead to the president’s removal from office based on the ultimate decision of the Supreme Leader and Supreme Court.

However, the criteria for sending Rouhani’s file to the judiciary was not met, according to a senior parliamentary official. On September 2nd, Behrooz Nemati, spokesperson for parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani, stated that Rouhani’s file would not be sent to the judiciary. He stated: “The speaker’s team in a meeting today reached the conclusion that because the issue with Rouhani’s questions was not that he failed to implement the law, and that the questioners also didn’t raise this issue, submitting the questions to the judiciary is not necessary.”

During his parliamentary questioning, Rouhani avoided making controversial statements and refrained from discussing “unspeakable topics,” which he previously hinted he would. During a TV interview several weeks earlier, Rouhani stated that the then-upcoming parliamentary questioning would be a “good opportunity to more easily … discuss certain topics and issues.” Analyst Hossein Bastani speculated that Rouhani’s meeting with Ayatollah Khamenei prior to his parliamentary questioning changed his mind in this regard. Bastani wrote: “At the beginning of his speech, Rouhani set the expectations for his address, stating: ‘I am hopeful that I will carefully cover the points the Leader told me in his suggestions for today’s meeting’ … Were some of the Leader’s suggestions regarding the president’s possible temptation to discuss unspeakable topics? It is not clear.”

The day after Rouhani’s parliamentary questioning, Rouhani and senior administration officials met with Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei for an annual gathering marking “presidential administration week.” Ayatollah Khamenei lauded Rouhani’s parliamentary questioning as demonstrating the Islamic Republic’s strength and reiterated support for the Rouhani administration–ending speculation that the episode could lead to Rouhani’s removal from office. Khamenei declared: “The meeting yesterday in parliament was a demonstration of the power and stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran and may God give good tidings to the president and the legislature for this demonstration of power.”

In his meeting with Rouhani administration officials, Khamenei stressed that Iranian officials should have doubt in Europeans being able to salvage the JCPOA and proclaimed that Iran will remain in the JCPOA as long as it remains in its national interests. Khamenei stated: “Continuing negotiations with Europe is not a problem but–while continuing this–any hope in them on the issues regarding the JCPOA and the economy must be ended.” He added about Iran’s commitment to the JCPOA: “The JCPOA is not a goal but a vessel. If we reach the conclusion that with this vessel, we cannot secure our national interests, we will put it aside.”

Ayatollah Khamenei also reiterated his opposition to any negotiations with the United States. He stated: “The result of negotiations with the previous U.S. officials, who cared about their appearance, was this. Now with these hateful and hideous current officials who openly are holding a sword against Iranians what negotiations can we have? As such, no negotiations at any level will be held with the Americans.”

 

Javad Zarif Accused of Abetting “Soft Regime Change” Efforts

On September 2nd, Foreign Minister Javad Zarif appeared before parliament and was questioned by principlist MP Javad Karimi-Ghodousi, who accused Zarif of abetting outside “soft regime change” efforts.  Ghodousi, affiliated with the hardline Jebhe Paydari, played a controversial documentary before parliament prior to questioning Zarif. The documentary and his questions sought to portray Zarif as having nefarious links with groups such as George Soros’ Open Society Foundations, Chatham House, and NIAC. Ghodousi also suggested the JCPOA was dictated to Zarif by the International Crisis Group, opining: “In the Cobourg hotel, the president of the International Crisis Group came out with you on the balcony … International Crisis Group produced six reports for the JCPOA, of which the third one is based on documentation that formed the text Iran agreed to [in the JCPOA]. Mr. Zarif did you negotiate or did they give you the text of the agreement?”

Ghodousi also stated that Zarif’s foreign policy approach opens the door to American regional hegemony.   “In your recent trips, you went there [to the International Crisis Group] and declared that neither Iran or Saudi Arabia can establish regional hegemony. The hegemony of the Islamic Revolution is pure Islam, Saudis’ hegemony is Wahhabi Islam. If neither Iran or Saudis, then it will be American hegemony [in the region].”

Ghodousi also blasted Chatham House and NIAC. He claimed: “Chatham House is the strongest think tank in the world and an English, non-American think tank. It creates neo-colonialization plans, and this is the same place that nominated you [Zarif] and John Kerry for the Nobel Peace Prize, which you however did not attend. However, such a relationship is not normal.” He further opined: “The third group connected to you is NIAC, a group of Iranian Americans in America. When you went to America and in your communications with them exchanged intelligence, you may not realize the issues, but the results of these meetings and communications was to the benefit of Chatham House, NIAC, and their friends.”

In his rebuttals, Zarif denied that anyone on Iran’s nuclear negotiating had dual citizenship—which has become a persistent criticism by Rouhani’s conservative rivals. Zarif stated: “If someone even has a spouse that has dual citizenship, they cannot work for the foreign ministry, much less for themselves to be a dual citizen. However, utilizing foreign advisors is possible and is a norm in international relations.” Zarif also defended the “patriotism” of Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani, an advisor to Iran’s negotiating team who was sentenced five years in prison in October 2017, but stated that “but I have no knowledge regarding other issues about him.”

 

Green Movement Leader Challenges Ayatollah Khamenei

On September 2nd, Green movement opposition figure Mehdi Karroubi released a critical letter addressed to the Assembly of Experts—the elected body constitutionally-mandated with appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader. The letter directly cast blame for Iran’s problems on Ayatollah Khamenei and called on the Assembly of Experts to hold him to account. Karoubi stated: “The Assembly of Experts must hold the Leader accountable for his policies over the past three decades that have led to the current situation. Why don’t they question him over the entrance of the Revolutionary Guards, Basij, and police forces into banking, selling oil, etc.?”

In response to Karroubi’s letter, Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, the spokesperson for the Guardian Council—another constitutional body charged with vetting candidates who seek office—rebuked Karroubi and implied the letter was written by hostile foreign powers. Kadkhodaei stated: “The text of recent days of Mr. Karroubi is reminiscent of his statements in 2009. Statements that are seemingly not from him but are written for him, just like the decisions they make for him. If only he could escape the prison of those around him and think for himself. And decide for himself and write for himself.”

 

Other Developments

Hamid Baeidinejad, Iran’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, wrote in his Telegram his thoughts on the need for the Iranian people to be vigilant in the face of foreign manipulation. Baeidinejad contended that America’s “official position” on Iran is “economic warfare.” He stated that the Trump administration seeks to fan the flames of discontent in Iran and urged the Iranian people to be discerning in the news they read. “Don’t trust everything you read or hear. Verify the validity of a report from a credible source your trust. Don’t forward every piece of news or analysis. Take seriously the psychological and propaganda war,” he opined.

Intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi gave a far-reaching TV interview on August 29th, touching on subjects ranging from combating terrorism and economic cooperation, to increased cooperation between Iran’s intelligence agencies. Alavi stated that Iran is actively confronting 32 terrorist groups, that Iran’s enemies want to “create a Syria situation for Iran,” and highlighted actions the intelligence ministry has taken to destroy ISIS cells and crackdown on economic corruption. He also stated that cooperation between Iran’s intelligence agencies was at a peak, declaring: “Under this administration, cooperation between the different intelligence institutions is greater than in previous eras, and the Leader has expressed happiness over the cooperation between the intelligence ministry and the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence apparatus.”

Amid an ongoing scandal over a diaper shortage, columnist Davood Heshmati writes in the reformist Emtedad on discoveries of stockpiles of stored diapers. Heshmati argues that the main “battle” in Iranian politics is between those with hope in the future and those who are trying to destroy hope. Heshmati writes: “The issue of the rising costs of diapers has become a hot-button issue in recent days. From late August, through coverage by principlist outlets, it has been turned into an evident ‘problem.'” He added: “But if we paid attention, we see that at the same time 2 warehouses where diapers have been stockpiled have been discovered.”

Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Alireza Tangsiri as the commander of the Navy of the Revolutionary Guards, replacing Ali Fadavi. Conservative Javan noted that Tangsiri is well-known and feared by outside military powers operating in the Persian Gulf. It wrote: “Until now, the English twice, the Americans twice, the Australians once, and the Canadians once have been arrested by the Revolutionary Guards for violating Iranian waters. At the heart of all these arrests, one person’s name is above all, commander Alireza Tangsiri.”

Ayatollah Khamenei dismissed the possibility of a war in a meeting with commanders and officials from the Iranian Army’s Air Defense division on September 2nd. Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “based on political calculations, the possibility for a military war does not exist. However, the Armed Forces’ human and material capabilities must be improved on a day to day basis, with vigilance and by management that is efficient and flexible.”


Below please find a summary of key developments in Iran:

On August 21st, a prominent religious eulogist, Mansour Arzi, repeated an implicit threat against Rouhani’s life if he pursues negotiations with the United States.

  • The previous week [as covered in last week’s Iran Unfiltered], an anti-Rouhani group in Qom—mostly the far-right Jebhe Paydari faction—held a gathering that spurred immense controversy, particularly over a placard that threatened Rouhani. The gathering and the placard were condemned across Iran’s political spectrum, including by the Revolutionary Guards and senior Ayatollahs. Nevertheless, Arzi repeated the threat on Arafat Day prayers, an important Shia holiday.
  • Arzi: “This person [Rouhani] will die like the other in a pool [referring to Rafsanjani]. Those who commit treason will die in such a way that at the end, friend and enemy, believer and disbeliever, will ask what are they doing here?”

On August 25th, reformist Arman newspaper wrote of the threats against Rouhani:

  • “In a circumstance where society needs unity in words so that internally we can overcome our problems, someone with a high perch says words and slogans which clerics and marjas have condemned … it is not clear what aim they have. The important point is not that these gatherings occurred or who participated, but the ideology behind it which needs to be identified.”

On August 26th, Mohammad-Hassan Nabavi, a deputy for propagation and practical training in the national seminaries, sought to downplay the controversial placard and doubled down on criticizing Rouhani.

  • Nabavi: “This was a huge mistake and an excuse should not be provided to anyone, but the question is really that from this slogan [on the placard] can it really be interpreted that we will kill the president?”
  • “I don’t get this from these words at all. Instead, it meant that whoever pursues negotiations, they might suffer problems. But it was a bad thing to say, it was a horrible and bad slogan.”
  • “A majority in the seminary do not agree with the Rouhani administration’s economic policies, its policies in the arena of negotiations. What I see in the seminary is that most do not approve of the Rouhani administration.”

On August 26th, Parisa Rafiee, a 21-year-old student of the arts at Tehran University arrested in March for participating in protests—was sentenced to 7 years in prison by branch 27 of Tehran’s Revolution Court, according to her lawyer Saeed Khalili.

  • Khalili: “She was charged with colluding to commit crimes against the country’s security, propagandizing against the state, and disturbing public order and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.”
  • “None of the activities mentioned in her indictment or in the Revolutionary Guards’ report were against the law, unfortunately with this verdict, justice and legal and sharia principles were trampled, God Willing I will appeal.”
  • “Other than intelligence ministry, it’s better that other institutions do not intervene on such issues because military institutions are pillar of nation’s security and if their position is hurt, it’s to the detriment of national security.”

On September 4th, Reza Khandan, the husband of imprisoned lawyer and human rights activist Nasrin Sotoudeh, was arrested.

  • Nasrin Sotoudeh was herself arrested on June 23rd. In the preceding months she was representing several women who were arrested in the anti-compulsory hijab protests of the spring of 2018.
  • Ten days before Khandan’s arrest, Sotoudeh announced that she was going on hunger strike to protest her arrest and the way her file was being addressed.
  • After the 2009 Green movement protests, Sotoudeh was a lawyer representing many arrested protesters. She was first arrested in September 2010, and after several rounds of going on hunger strike, was released in September 2013.

On August 31st, Fatemeh Saeedi, a member of parliament representing Tehran, said she met with a judiciary official and was promised that the sentences against Parisa Rafiee and other arrested students and women would be changed favorably.

  • Saeidi wrote on her Instagram page of her meeting with a senior judiciary official: “Yesterday I had a meeting with a senior judiciary official. We extensively discussed the situation of students and the heavy sentences that have been issued. He showed me a print-out belonging to the science minister which listed all the students who have been given heavy sentences, including Parisa Rafiee. He said he would do everything he can to change their sentences.”
  • Saeidi: “I was also promised that the cases of the women arrested in the July/August protests would be resolved quickly in favorable fashion.”

On September 3rd, Saeedi also stated that she had written a letter to the speaker of parliament Ali Larijani and senior judiciary officials asking for clemency regarding the imprisonment of three teachers and other prisoners.

  • She stated: “We have also had different meetings with judiciary officials regarding other prisoners such as environmental activists, students, and especially women prisoners, which we are hopeful will reach an ideal resolution.”

On August 29th, Mohammad Reza Farahani, deputy minister for culture and students in the ministry of science, said regarding the cases of students arrested during the late December/early January protests:

  • “6 of the 14 students arrested have been exonerated by the courts.”
  • “14 students from the medical science universities were arrested in the events of late December/early January. 2 of them have been sentenced … one is a student from Semnan who has been sentenced to attend Friday prayers for 2 years, the other is from Bandar Abbas who has been sentence to imprisonment.”
  • “For the other 6, their files are yet to be addressed by the courts.”

On September 4th, Parvaneh Salahshouri, a reformist member of parliament representing Tehran, delivered a fiery speech before parliament expressing dissent at current political and economic conditions in the country and calling for a referendum.

  • Salahshouri directed her comments towards Ayatollah Khamenei, because, she stated, “I believe the only way to overcome the current dire situation is for the Leader to enter the scene to save the country.”
  • Salahshouri said it was necessary to turn to a referendum on issues such as “foreign policy, the management of state TV, and the role of the Guardian Council in stewarding elections for parliament and the assembly of experts.”
  • Salahshouri highlighted issues such as “the imprisonment of students, teachers, laborers, lawyers, and environment activists,” “the entrance of military forces in the fields of politics, economics, and culture” as major crises facing the Islamic Republic.

On September 4nd, Hajar Chenarani, an independent MP representing the northeastern city of Nishapur, also delivered a fiery rebuke of the current political and economic conditions in the country:

  • Chenarani: “Iran is not stricken by war, disease, nor floods and is not bankrupt. But it is stricken by treason. Some have committed treason and are traitors.”
  • “The proud Iran has been belittled by the behaviors of some Islamic Republic officials.”

On August 26th, the Iranian parliament impeached President Rouhani’s minister of economics and finance, Masoud Karbasian. The vote was 138 in favor, 121 against, and 2 abstentions. It came weeks after Rouhani’s labor minister Ali Rabiee was also impeached.

  • There were 17 charges brought against Karbasian, including “not paying attention to the resistance economy, and failing to support domestic production” and blaming him for overseeing the economic downturn.
  • Karbasian had only been in his position for the past year.
  • Karbasian said at his impeachment hearing: “Some of the issues that have arisen on the economy have been exogenous and out of control of the administration. Some other issues aren’t structural, but due to the unreliability of the hegemonic system [the U.S.].”
  • Karbasian: “It cannot be expected that the problems that have arisen in the past year can be easily resolved.”
  • Karbasian: “Despite negative narratives pushed internationally, in 2017 more we had more than $5 billion in foreign investment, a 50% growth from previous year. In past year we had 3.7% economic growth.”  

On August 28th, President Hassan Rouhani appeared before parliament for questioning before 204 members (of the legislatures total 290 members). The questions were on five issues:

  1. The failure of administration to control smuggling.
  2. The resumption of economic sanctions.
  3. Failure to take proper action on unemployment.
  4. The economic recession.
  5. The depreciation of the Rial.

The MPs had 30 minutes to ask questions and Rouhani had one hour to respond. The MPs then voted on how convincing each answer was and referred the questions they weren’t convinced on to the judiciary. Highlights of Rouhani’s answers:

  • “Why has the people’s sense of hope changed? Why do they doubt Iran’s future and even more, some doubt the state’s greatness, power, and future growth and development? We have to cure this shock.”
  • “We have to speak with the people in a correct and honest way so that people are convinced that the problems of the past months will pass quickly.”
  • “The events of late Dec/early Jan [protests] persuaded Trump to take advantage of the situation and announce that he would withdraw from the JCPOA, unless Europeans and others supported him over the missile and regional issues.”
  • “The key is that we have to explain to the people that these problems will be overcome with the guidance of the Leader, and coordination between the 3 branches and the armed forces.”
  • “We have to tell the people that we won’t allow America’s plots to be successful. The people should be certain, we won’t allow a bunch of anti-Iranians in the White House to plot against us.”
  • “But our people aren’t content, which is justified. Why because there is still widespread unemployment. This chronic unemployment has existed for years. Many families still suffer from this issue.”
  • “But if the 11th & 12 administrations continued the work of the 9th & 10th admin [Ahmadinejad], today our rate of unemployment would be 22% instead of 12%, which is to the credit of our officials, who with help from the other branches & officials have managed this great achievement.”
  • “This is as we were the first administration since the end of the war that entered office facing a recession.”
  • “We have to ask how the currency issue reached what it is today? What is the cause? Political, psychological, or economic or a combination of all these?”
  • “I say on the currency issue, social, psychological, political, and foreign policy problems had a greater effect than the economic factor.”

On August 28th, Hassan Zeidabadi, a reformist columnist, wrote regarding Rouhani’s questioning in parliament and the implications of parliament not being convinced of his answers on four of their five questions and referring these questions to the judiciary.

  • “With the MPs not convinced on several of Rouhani’s answers, what are the legal and political implications?”
  • “It seems even many MPs don’t know the answer.”
  • “Parliament today implemented Article 88 of the constitution. This article gives the right of one-fourth of the parliamentarians to question the president.”
  • “This law cannot lead to the president’s impeachment but can lead to his dismissal by the Supreme Leader.”
  • “Impeaching the president has another legal route, which is in Article 89 of the constitution.”
  • “Articles 212 and 213 of the parliament’s internal rules of conduct deals with the method of questioning the president. What is relevant in this regard is a footnote of Article 213, which sets two conditions for sending the president’s file to the judiciary:
    1. Failing to convince a majority of the MPs present.
    2. The subject of the question deals with a violation of law or failing to implement the law.
  • “The parliament’s internal rules of conduct do not specify who must interpret the second condition. Violating the law or failing to implement the law are obtuse conditions and attaching them to today’s questions [of Rouhani] depends on the political configuration and inclinations in parliament.”
  • “So what if Rouhani’s file is sent to the judiciary? If this occurs, Rouhani’s dismissal will be based on Article 110 of the Constitution, which requires a vote of approval from the Supreme Court and then by the Supreme Leader. The only criteria in the constitution is whether it is expedient for the country, which is again the Leader’s responsibility to decide.”

On August 28th, news site Asr Iran also analyzed the implications of Rouhani’s answers being sent to the judiciary:

  • “To answer this question, we have to refer to the Parliament’s internal rules for conduct. In Article 213 it states: “If most of the MPs present questioning the president aren’t convinced of his answer, and the issue being questioned deals with a violation of the law or failing to implement the law, the question will be sent to the judiciary.”
  • “In the recent meeting, the first criteria—of most members present not being convinced of the president’s answer—was met. However, it must be investigated whether the issue being questioned represents a violation of the law or failing to implement the law.
  • “The Parliamentarians were not convinced with Rouhani’s answers to 4 of their questions regarding ‘smuggling, unemployment, recession, and currency depreciations.’  All these issues are administrative issues in nature and none represent a violation of any laws.”
  • “Thus from a legal view it can be set that the second criteria of Article 213 has not been met and sending Rouhani’s file to the judiciary will have no legal basis.”

An August 28th BBC Persian column by analyst Hossein Bastani discussed the fact that Rouhani did not shed light on “unspeakable” topics, as he had previously hinted he would.

  • “Three weeks ago, during his live widely-discussed TV interview, he himself stated that responding to the parliamentarian’s questions was a ‘good opportunity,’ because he would be able to ‘more easily than when he gives a speech or interview discuss certain issues and topics.’
  • “But at the beginning of his speech, Rouhani set the expectations for his address, stating: ‘I am hopeful that I will carefully cover the points the Leader told me in his suggestions for today’s meeting.'”
  • “Were some of the Leader’s suggestions regarding the president’s possible temptation to discuss unspeakable topics? It is not clear.”
  • “Rouhani is not the first Iranian president who went to parliament for questioning. That was Ahmadinejad in March 2012. But after Ahmadinejad didn’t take that seriously, the parliament amended its internal rules for conduct to increase the costs of the president not answering their questions.”

On September 2nd, Behrooz Nemati, the spokesperson for speaker of the parliament Ali Larijani, stated that Rouhani’s file would not be submitted to the judiciary.

  • Nemati: “The speaker’s team in its meeting today reached the conclusion that because the issue with Rouhani’s questions was not that he failed to implement the law, and that the questioners also didn’t raise this issue, submitting the questions to the judiciary is not necessary.”

On August 29th, the day after Rouhani’s appearance in parliament, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei met with Rouhani and senior administration officials as part of “administration week” events in Iran. Ayatollah Khamenei expressed support for Rouhani and commended his appearance before parliament as a display of the strength of the Islamic Republic—ending speculation that Rouhani might be impeached or removed from office by the Supreme Leader.

  • Khamenei said regarding the first year of Rouhani second term in office: “In this year, good work has been accomplished in the fields of economic and energy growth, increasing non-oil exports, and reducing imports. The trend of increasing exports and reducing imports must continue at a greater pace, and at the same time these achievements made clear to the people.”
  • Khamenei on the ongoing negotiations between Iran and Europe to salvage the nuclear deal: “Continuing negotiations with Europe is not a problem but–while continuing this–any hope in them on the issues of the JCPOA and the economy must be ended.”
  • “We must have a doubtful view towards their [European] commitments. We must very vigilant regarding the trajectory of this issue.”
  • On Iran’s compliance with the JCPOA: “The JCPOA is not a goal but a vessel. If we reach the conclusion that with this vessel, we cannot secure out national interests, we will put it aside.”
  • On negotiations with the U.S.: “The result of negotiations with previous U.S. officials, who cared about their appearance, was this. Now with these hateful and hideous current officials who openly are holding a sword against Iranians what negotiations can we have? As such, no negotiations at any level will be held with the Americans.
  • On Rouhani’s appearance in parliament: “The meeting yesterday in parliament was a demonstration of the power and stability of the Islamic Republic of Iran and may God give good tidings to the president and the legislature demonstrated this power.”
  • “Members of parliament ask questions of a president who was elected with over 23 million votes, and the president responds in a calm and sober way. This is the definition of religious democracy.”
  • On September 2nd, Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif appeared before parliament for questioning. Principlist MP Javad Karimi-Ghodousi, who represents a district in the religious city of Mashhad and is affiliated with the ultra-conservative Jebhe Paydari faction, accused Zarif’s foreign ministry of being infiltrated by foreign spies and facilitating U.S. efforts at regime change. (Links 1 & 2).
  •   Ghodousi played a controversial documentary at parliament prior to questioning Zarif. The documentary and Ghodousi’s questions sought to portray Zarif as having nefarious links with groups such as George Soros’ Open Society Foundations, Chatham House, and NIAC.
  •   Ghodousi: “What was the head of the International Crisis Group doing in your room? In the Cobourg hotel, the president of the International Crisis Group came out with you on the balcony … International Crisis Group produced six reports for the JCPOA, of which the third one is based on documentation that formed the text Iran agreed to [in the JCPOA]. Mr. Zarif did you negotiate or did they give you the text of the agreement?”
  •   “This group [International Crisis Group] which is based in Belgium and many influential Americans and Europeans are there and its financial father is George Soros, produced six reports for Iran and only one report on how the JCPOA would be approved by America’s Congress and our previous Parliament.”
  •   “In your recent trips, you went there [International Crisis Group] and declared that neither Iran or Saudi Arabia can establish regional hegemony. The hegemony of the Islamic Revolution is pure Islam, Saudis’ hegemony is Wahhabi Islam. If neither Iran or Saudis, then it will be American hegemony [in the region].”
  •   “Chatham House is the strongest think tank in the world and an English, non-American think tank. It creates neo-colonialization plans, and this is the same place that nominated you [Zarif] and John Kerry for the Nobel Peace Prize, which you however did not attend. However, such a relationship is not normal.”
  •   “The third group connected to you is NIAC, a group of Iranian Americans in America. When you went to America and in your communications with them exchanged intelligence, you may not realize the issues, but the results of these meetings and communications was to the benefit of Chatham House, NIAC, and their friends.”
  •   Ghodousi: “I will give the documentary today to news outlets along with two other documentaries that were created by the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence unit.”
  •   Zarif defended Abdolrasoul Dorri-Esfahani, an advisor to Iran’s nuclear negotiating team who in October 2017 was sentenced to 5 years in prison on charges of espionage.
  •   Zarif on Dorri-Esfahani: “I have no doubt about his patriotism, but I have no knowledge regarding other issues about him.”
  •   Ghodousi, in his 3 questions of Zarif, claimed that four members of Zarif’s nuclear negotiating team had foreign citizenship on top of their Iranian citizenship.
  •   Zarif said in response regarding individuals with dual citizenship: “I emphasize that no dual citizens had any role or responsibility in the negotiations. If someone even has a spouse that has dual citizenship, they cannot work for the foreign ministry, much less for themselves to be a dual citizen. However, utilizing foreign advisors is possible and is a norm in international relations.”

On September 2nd, a letter written by Mehdi Karoubi was posted on Saham News—a site affiliated with Karoubi. The Green movement opposition leader—who previously served as parliamentary speaker and in other senior posts—has been under house arrest since 2011 together with fellow 2009 presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi. The letter was addressed to members of the Assembly of Experts—a body constitutionally-mandated with appointing and supervising the Supreme Leader.

  • Karoubi in the letter: “Article 107 of the constitution delegates the power to appoint the supreme leader to the assembly of experts, which is directly elected by the people. Article 111 explicitly states: ‘In the case that the Leader proves incapable of carrying out his duties, is missing the criteria in tenets 50 and 109, or it becomes clear that these criteria were missing from the beginning, he will be removed from his office. Interpreting these conditions will be the responsibility of the Assembly of Experts.”
  • “The Assembly of Experts must hold the Leader accountable for his policies over the past three decades that have led to the current situation. Why don’t they question him over the entrance of the Revolutionary Guards, Basij, and police forces into banking, selling oil, etc.?”
  • Karroubi asked the Assembly of Experts to “hold to account the military and economic institutions under the purview of the Leader who have played a central role in creating today’s unfortunate situation for the people and country.”
  • “I believe in reforms, but of the kind that reforms the structure of the system in the direction of more sovereignty for the people and that gives no privileged position to any individual or groups.”

Abbas-Ali Kadkhodaei, the spokesperson for the Guardian Council—another constitutional body charged with vetting candidates who seek office—responded to Karroubi’s letter on Twitter:

  • “The text of recent days of Mr Karoubi are reminiscent of his statements in 2009. Statements that are seemingly not from him but are written for him, just like the decisions they make for him. If only he could escape the prison of those around him and think for himself. And decide for himself and write for himself.”

On August 31st, Hamid Baeidinejad, Iran’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, wrote in his Telegram his thoughts on the need for the Iranian people to be vigilant in the face of foreign manipulation:

  • Baedinejad: “Economic warfare against Iran is America’s official position.”
  • “Trump and the American foreign minister [Secretary of State Mike Pompeo] have stressed that their intention with imposing pressure and sanctions is to create discontent and turn the Iranian people against Iran’s government to topple the Iranian government in this way.”
  • “Don’t trust everything you read or hear. Verify the validity of a report from a credible source you trust. Don’t forward every piece of news or analysis. Take seriously the psychological and propaganda war.”

On August 29th, Iranian intelligence minister Mahmoud Alavi gave a far-reaching TV interview, touching on subjects ranging from combating terrorism and economic cooperation, to increased cooperation between Iran’s intelligence agencies.

  • “The terrorists forces aligned against the Islamic Republic of Iran consist of 32 terrorist groups.”
  • “They are seeking to create a Syria situation for Iran. They wanted to assassinated 5 Sunni clerics to start a Shia-Sunni war, but we suffocated this plot. Sunnis play an integral role in confronting these terrorist movements.”
  • “Standing against these groups is not easy. This month we discovered a plot to attacks facilities such as universities and the subway system.”
  • “In July 16th, we took down an ISIS cell in Tehran. We hope that with the people’s assistance we can continue this path successfully.”
  • “If we want a strong economy we have to confront corrupt economic actors. In the intelligence ministry we have created 130 files and arrested more than 180 accused. The intelligence ministry is also playing a unique role in confronting the smuggling of goods and currency.”
  • “We strive to make the environment secure for domestic producers and insecure for corrupt economic actors.”
  • “Under this administration, cooperation between the different intelligence institutions is greater than in previous eras, and the Leader has expressed happiness over the cooperation between the intelligence ministry and the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence apparatus.”

On September 3rd, Davood Heshmati, wrote in the reformist Emtedad on the controversy over a diaper shortage and how the main “battle” in Iranian politics is between those with hope in the future and those who are trying to destroy hope.

  • Heshmati: “The issue of the rising costs of diapers has become a hot-button issue in recent days. From late August, through coverage by principlist outlets, it has been turned into an evident ‘problem.'”
  • “With the Leader’s recent address to administration officials [where he mentioned the diaper issue] it has taken greater form and become a more important issue.”
  • “But if we paid attention, we see that at the same time 2 warehouses where diapers have been stockpiled have been discovered. The first report from IRNA was of a discovery of a warehouse in Savojbolagh which was storing over 10 billion tomans worth of diapers.”
  • “The 2nd report was from ISNA of the discovery of one and half million packages of diapers in Alborz province.”
  • “Everyone is worried that the diaper they bought today will become more expensive tomorrow, so they hoard … what has to be reformed is bringing back hope. One side believes in creating ‘hope’ and the other in ‘ending hope,’ this is the main battle on-going right now.”

On August 23rd, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei appointed Alireza Tangsiri as the commander of the Navy of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, replacing Ali Fadavi. Conservative outlet Javan said of Tangsiri’s appointment:

  • “Most of the naval forces of outside powers in the Persian Gulf, because of the field of operations of the Revolutionary Guards navy, know admiral Tangsiri, and they all know that this appointment, in the midst of economic pressure against Iran, is not without reason.”
  • “Until now, the English twice, the Americans twice, the Australians once, and the Canadians once have been arrested by the Revolutionary Guards for violating Iranian waters. At the heart of all these arrests, one person’s name is above all, commander Alireza Tangsiri.”

On September 2nd, Ayatollah Khamenei met with commanders and officials from the Iranian Army’s Air Defense division and dismissed the possibility of a military conflict but stressed the need for the Iranian military to upgrade its capabilities.

  • Ayatollah Khamenei stated that “based on political calculations, the possibility for a military war does not exist. However, the Armed Forces’ human and material capabilities must be improved on a day to day basis, with vigilance and by management that is efficient and flexible.”
  • Khamenei also declared that “the Air Defense division is a very sensitive part of the Armed Forces and is on the frontlines against Iran’s enemies, and that the readiness and capabilities of its air defenses and personal must be increased.”

 

 
August 16, 2018 Comments are off Sina Toossi
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Shifting Social and Political Landscape in Iran As Trump Ramps up Pressure

Week of August 13, 2018 | Iran Unfiltered is a weekly digest tracking Iranian politics & society by the National Iranian American Council | Subscribe Here

  • Iran’s political elites have rejected immediate talks, though some have signaled flexibility if the U.S. returns to the nuclear deal
  • Hardliners scapegoat Rouhani amid measured support from Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei
  • U.S. pressure has spurred increased calls for unity among  parts of the ruling elite
  • Continued protests highlight depth of generational divide, institutional incapacities 
  • Reformist leaders and Green Movement leaders under house arrest issue calls for major change but condemn foreign intervention

Amid continued sporadic protests and reinstated U.S. sanctions, the political and social landscape inside Iran is in a state of flux. The depreciation of the Rial and rising inflation have fueled economic grievances and spurred intense debate over both domestic shortcomings and foreign threats. However, bitter jockeying between political factions has given way to a collective sense of needing to put aside differences for the sake of preserving stability and the ruling system. Senior officials have also united in rejecting Donald Trump’s offer for an unconditional meeting with President Rouhani but have differed on the nature and severity of their opposition to renewed U.S.-Iran negotiations.

Demonstrations

A new wave of protests that began in the city of Isfahan on July 31st spread to other parts of the country, including Tehran, Mashhad, Hamedan, Kazeroun, and Shiraz. Though small in scope, the protests lasted for days and underscored the failure of governmental institutions to address the economic and political grievances that have brought many Iranians to the streets since late December 2017. According to journalists and human rights activists, dozens of protesters were arrested across the country and one protestor, 26-year-old Reza Outadi, was killed on August 3rd in Karaj, north-west of Tehran. The Prosecutor General of Karaj has since stated that an investigation has been launched into the killing.

The protests and deteriorating economic situation have been used by Iran’s competing political factions to advance their contrasting agendas. President Rouhani has sought to push ahead with his 2017 presidential campaign promises of increased institutional transparency and economic liberalization, particularly with respect to the privatization of semi-public or Revolutionary Guards-operated industries. On the other hand, conservative rivals of Rouhani have held him responsible for the country’s economic woes, placing more blame on his management of the economy than U.S. sanctions. Meanwhile, prominent reformists and Green Movement leader Mehdi Karroubi–who along with 2009 reformist presidential candidate Mir Hossein Mousavi continues to be under house arrest–have called for immediate and far-reaching reforms but have also condemned foreign intervention and urged unity between ruling elites and the general population.

Prominent sociologist Maghsoud Farasatkhah discussed the protests in a recent interview with the reformist Shargh newspaper. He opined: “We cannot lose sight of the fact that these protests are not representative of the voice of all the people in Iranian society, they aren’t even representative of critics and dissidents in society, but they are nonetheless an important voice and have the right to be heard and must be heard.” Farasatkhah further stated: “The youth have played an important role in these protests .. we are talking about a generation that is up to date in the world on communication and information and will, despite any limitations, connect to the world, and familiarize themselves with different issues.”

“Resistance” Economy vs. Rouhani Calls for Breaking Up IRGC Economic Power

A recent letter by Iran’s powerful Assembly of Experts—charged with monitoring and appointing the Supreme Leader—laid much of the blame for Iran’s economic downturn on Rouhani. “What has caused the current unacceptable economic conditions is weak economic management and non-belief in the ‘resistance economy’ and infiltration by the enemy and corruption … and having an economic pivot to foreigners,” the letter stated. “It is expected that the President, without hesitation, changes in a major way his cabinet and senior economic managers.”

Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei also entered the fray in a recent speech in which he censured the Rouhani administration’s handling of the economy. “Most economic experts and many officials say that the cause all of these problems are not sanctions but are due to internal problems and the method of management and implementing policies,” Ayatollah Khamenei stated. “I won’t say that sanctions have no effect, but most of our recent economic problems are related to actions than have been taken and, if better, more prudent, and stronger actions are taken, the sanctions will not have much of an effect and we can stand against them.”

However, Ayatollah Khamenei also voiced support for President Rouhani in the face of calls for his resignation by some conservatives, declaring: “Those who say the administration must be impeached are playing a role in the enemy’s plan … The government must stay in power and with strength accomplish its responsibilities to alleviate problems.”

Ayatollah Khamenei also lauded a letter by 38 economists friendly to the Rouhani administration outlining prescriptions for addressing Iran’s economic crises. Notably, the economists’ letter stated that Iran’s current downturn was partly due to “figures not responsible for foreign policy entering foreign policy arena” and called for “clear and wise positions based on positive diplomatic engagement to be officially announced regarding foreign policy,” increased privatization, and the end of military (i.e. Revolutionary Guards) involvement in the economy. The economists’ call for non-foreign ministry officials refraining from commenting on foreign policy was likely a reference to comments by the commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, Mohammad Ali Jafari, who personally penned a letter to Trump and vociferously rejected his offer of unconditional talks with Rouhani.

Condemnations of Leaders “Looking to the West”

The return of U.S. sanctions has also spurred renewed talk of Iran’s foreign policy orientation and whether it can rely on the West or should pivot decisively towards rising powers such as Russia and China. The conservatives, known as “principlists,” have sought to downplay the effect of economic sanctions largely because of their fundamental opposition to detente with the United States and belief that Iran must overcome its problems by relying on domestic resources. The principlist school of thought in Iran is rigidly attached to the ideological principles of the Islamic revolution and sees an unavoidable clash between an independent Iran and the United States.

A recent editorial in the principlist Kayhan criticized officials that “look to the West” to solve the country’s economic problems. “The manager who isn’t able to make effort to solve problems gives the wrong address, and says we have problems because there are sanctions and the path we must take is negotiations and deals with America,” the editorial stated. Another recent Kayhan editorial called for Iran to form deeper ties with the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO) countries, stating: “Countries in the SCO have 50 percent of the global population and a third of the global production of goods and services. The future of the global economy is in the east … the sooner Iran realizes that the West won’t secure its interests, it will have a better future.”

Negotiations with the U.S.

Ayatollah Khamenei also ruled out negotiations with the Trump White House, stating that the administration was ” playing a worn-out tactic that is worthless politically … one of them says without condition [we will meet], the other lays out the conditions.” He went on: “Even if the impossible occurred and we negotiated with the Americans, we definitely won’t negotiate with the current administration.” However, he also added a caveat:  “We can only enter the dangerous game of negotiations with the U.S. when we feel we’ve reached a point of economic, political, & cultural authority and U.S. pressures and blackmail don’t affect us—but for now negotiations will definitely be to our detriment and are forbidden.”

President Rouhani and Foreign Minister Javad Zarif have in recent interviews stressed that Iran was not the side that left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”) and that Iran is not intransigent regarding pursuing diplomatic compromise. “We negotiated on every word on JCPOA and Trump with one signature voided it. And now he comes and talks of negotiations? This just a propaganda ploy,” Zarif proclaimed in an August 6th press conference.

In an August 15th meeting with administration officials, Rouhani blamed Trump for shuttering the diplomatic channels that had formed between the two countries under the Obama administration and called for Trump to first rebuild these connections before speaking of meeting. “The U.S. itself has acted in such a way that has destroyed the circumstances required for negotiations. It has burned its bridges,” Rouhani proclaimed. “Now, the U.S. is standing on the other side … If it is honest, it should fix that bridge again.”

 


Below please find a summary of key developments in Iran:

Fatemeh Karroubi, wife of Green Movement leader Mehdi Karroubi, recently met with former President Mohammad Khatami and delivered a message from the opposition leader under house arrest.

  • “Hojatoleslam Karroubi has for the entirety of his detention and more than his own fate has thought about the people, the country, and is worried about the condition of the people and the revolution and Iran being hurt by external and internal dangers.”
  • “Hojatoleslam Karroubi while condemning the pressures against the Rouhani administration, criticizes the shortcomings that we witness in government officials and asks that tangible, coherent, and immediate steps be taken to alleviate current problems and eliminate the dangers that face our dear Iran.”
  • “Hojatoleslam Karroubi asks all Iranians who care for the revolution and the country to put aside their differences, and especially the different reformist currents, to show that they understand the pain of the people and country through coordination and solidarity.”

Ayatollah Khamenei in a major speech on August 13 ruled out negotiations with the Trump administration and defended the Rouhani administration against calls for his resignation.

  • Khamenei on the nuclear negotiations leading to the JCPOA: “I pushed strongly for hard positions. However, the red lines I outlined were not met.”
  • On negotiations with the U.S.: “We can only enter the dangerous game of negotiations with the United States when we feel we’ve reached a point of economic, political, & cultural authority & U.S. pressures and blackmail don’t affect us—but for now negotiations will definitely be to our detriment and are forbidden.”
  • “We will not negotiate with Americans for reasons based on precise arguments, our past experience, and the wide-ranging costs of negotiations with a regime that is untrustworthy and aggressive, and in the light of unity between the people and officials, we will easily pass through this period.”
  • On effect of U.S. sanctions: “Most economic experts and many officials that the cause of all these problems are not sanctions but are due to internal problems and the method of management and implementing policies.”
  • “I won’t say that sanctions have no effect, but most of our recent economic problems are related to actions taken and if better, more prudent, and stronger actions were taken, the sanctions will not have much of an effect and we can stand against them.”
  • Khamenei voiced his support for a letter from 38 economists to Rouhani outlining recommendations for alleviating Iran’s current economic crisis. The economists are allied to Rouhani: “Recently some economic specialists, who are not against the [Rouhani] administration and some are renowned, wrote a caring letter to the respected president and on top of reviewing the structural and current economic problems, offered solutions, of which most of these were correct.”
  • The letter by the economists stated that Iran’s current currency crisis is rooted in “public distrust”, the “instability in positions that have been taken domestically to confront increasing foreign tensions”, and “the figures not responsible for foreign policy entering foreign policy arena.” They called for “clear and wise positions based on positive engagement to be officially announced on foreign policy.” They called for increased privatization and the removal of any military involvement in the economy, among numerous other measures. Link.  
  • Called for aggressive actions against corruption, supported letter of head of judiciary.
  • On negotiations with the U.S.: “I stress there won’t be a war and we will not negotiate.”
  • “On this issue they are playing a worn-out tactic that is worthless politically, one of them says without condition [we will meet], the other lays out the conditions.”
  • “Given America’s formula for approach to negotiations, any government in the world that negotiates with them will have problems, unless they are totally aligned with the U.S., which even today is actually not the case as we see the current American government tries to force/bully the Europeans.”
  • “Even if the impossible occurred and we negotiated with the Americans, we definitely won’t negotiate with the current administration.”
  • “Negotiations with a bullying and demanding country like America is not a means to lower their hostility but it is a means of giving them tools with which they can more effectively commit hostility and reach their goals.”
  • “They are pursuing economic warfare to create discontent in the hopes this will turn into unrest and instability.

Iranian sociologist Maghsoud Farasatkhah on the protests in an interview with the reformist Shargh blames the government for failing to taking the steps necessary to alleviate grievances that cause protests. Stresses generational divide and structural inability to address problems:

  • “It’s not just the Rouhani administration and the executive branch that has responsibilities for these developments, but the entire government must take responsibility. Our entire social system and the prominent figures in our society must take responsibility and not just scapegoat the [Rouhani] administration.
  • “We cannot lose sight of the fact that these protests are not representative of the voice of all the people in Iranian society, they aren’t even representative of critics and dissidents in society, but they are nonetheless an important voice and have the right to be heard and must be heard.”
  • “At the present, there are many criticisms between the ruling elite. As long as there is not real reconciliation, there can’t be a minimum consensus on the problems in cities, the inequalities that exist, so they can reach an understanding of the poverty [that exists.]”
  • “The youth have played an important role in these protests .. we are talking about a generation that is up to date in the world on communication and information and will, despite any limitations, connect to the world, and familiarize themselves with different issues.”
  • “Our governmental institutions in many areas have not changed in accordance to the changes in society. These institutions are not even capable of seeing these changes. Some of the decisions that are taken for this society, have no meaning and are unacceptable by society.”
  • “They blame some issues on the executive branch, who in turn blames other branches. This is as the main issue is how people in society live … These voices have to be taken seriously and it’s necessary for [government-society] relations to change, such issues should not be reflexively viewed through a security lens.”
  • “If we had a strong civil society, there would be no need for these protests. Civil society is a calm space that in a peaceful and public way reflects on public issues and wisely engages in dialogue on these issues. When civil society is more aware, all pains are quickly heard and civil society can help the government to solve the problems by bringing psychological pressure.”

Iranian sociologist Saeed Madani in an interview with Shargh also emphasizes lack of opportunity for the youth:

  • “The phenomenon of unemployment among the youth and the educated [those with university degrees] has long afflicted the Iranian labor market and has expanded.”
  • “In the fall of 1393 (2014), unemployment was 10.5% and for the youth from ages 15 to 29 it was 21.8%. These numbers are far worse today given the economic recession.”
  • “Unfortunately there is no sign that the government has had the least bit of a clear and realistic understanding of the protests. If the voice of the protests were heard by officials, we should have witnessed serious changed in major policies. I have not seen the slightest change in policies affecting the economy, society, or culture.”

Donya Eqtesad piece arguing that many of the issues facing Iran today are due to the gradual weakening and undermining of the executive branch. It calls for more unity and less attacks on the executive branch/Rouhani administration:

  • “The current conditions are partly due to internal fights and foreign pressures, or to be more specific, the economic-psychological-security war of the United States against Iran.”
  • “The Iranian executive branch, which from 1360 to 1390 (2012) was the principal institution of the country after the Leadership, in that year became an ineffectual institution and even became a weight on the foot of other institutions.”
  • “The weakening of the executive branch … has two major implications that may be the biggest threats to national interests and security in all the years since the revolution. The first is the weakening of the political system speaking with one voice and an increase in contradictory comments by officials and non-officials.”
  • “The second is the message sent to society that nothing can be expected of the executive branch and public requests should be directed elsewhere. This means that the responsibility for shortcomings of the executive but that the whole system must be accountable. The small and sporadic protests of last winter and this past few weeks reflect this belief.”
  • “To escape the current situation, it is enough that, first senior officials believe that the system is stable, second, everyone rereads the constitution regarding what their areas of responsibility are and aren’t, and third, give message to society that the responsibilities of the executive branch now have the attention of all institutions, and they should remember that the biggest demonstration of stability is to have calm and respectful dialogue.”

Prominent sociologist Hamid-Reza Jaleipour lauds Rouhani’s TV address:

  • “In my opinion Rouhani’s comments were overall good and in the current time of tension spurred calmness domestically and projected strength abroad … Rouhani also left the door open to negotiations with honor with America.”
  • “The impact of this calculated was seen the next day. The same day Trump imposed the first waves of sanctions against the Iranian people, we saw that the cost of gold dropped by 12 percent and the Euro lost 7 percent of its value against the Rial.”
  • “On foreign policy Rouhani made the right points. He said we had negotiations with America. We negotiated and reached an agreement and now Trump has turned his back on America’s promise. So the ball is on Trump’s side.”
  • “At the same time Rouhani was aware that for the Congressional elections, Trump needs a picture with Rouhani. But Rouhani, without ruling out negotiations, has essentially pushed the issue of negotiations with Trump to after the U.S. elections.”

Former reformist president Mohammad Khatami gave a speech last week to former parliamentarians in which he highlighted the need for reforms and offered 15 suggestions to alleviate Iran’s current problems. Highlights from the speech:

  • “[Outside] regime-changers know that as long as reformism is alive there is no room for regime change. Internally there are also those who are set on avenging and eliminating reformists—they’re other side of same scissor.”
  • “The passivity of the [Rouhani] administration and the surprise reaction of reformists in the face of such propaganda is shocking.”
  • “creating chaos in the hope of removing the Islamic Republic will not solve country’s problems. Actions by foreign powers sound alarm bells regarding threat of breaking up (partitioning) Iran.”
  • “The system must be reformable. Hopelessness regarding the system’s ability to reform is a serious problem that would be irreversible.”
  • “As a citizen who cares about Iran and Islam, from the bottom of my heart I apologize for shortcomings and deficiencies that currently exist.”
  • Khatami then outlined 15 suggestions to alleviate current crises faced by Iran:
    1. Creating and strengthening unity among all the different political factions. Removing zero-sum mentalities.
    2. Unity among all forces committed to aims of Iran’s glory, progress, and safety and security of Iranian people. National dialogue.
    3. Changing state TV’s programming angle. State TV shouldn’t just be representative of one perspective in society.
    4. Creating political atmosphere that is open, safe, and free.
    5. Eliminating thinking that narrows specialists, scientists, and politicians to those who “are like us.”
    6. Ending house arrest of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.
    7. Freeing all political prisoners and prisoners of conscious.
    8. Announcing public amnesty; giving trust to many specialist Iranians inside and outside the country to work for Iran’s progress.
    9. Removing unjust limitations; having elections that are open and free and centered on people’s aspirations and hope
    10. Ending extremism/radicalism; all factions have to works towards this.
    11. 3 branches of government must become more efficient and coordinate more.
    12. Hearing people’s grievances. We all need to hear these grievances and instead of preventing protests, we must work towards removing problems leading to protests.
    13. Accountability by Rouhani admin. Shortcomings cannot be blamed on political rivals, administration must prove its efficiency.
    14. Maintain people’s trust in parliament.
    15. Forming courts with juries selected from the ordinary people.

Sociologist Hamid Reza Jaleipour on Khatami’s speech, states that while reformists have lost votes as recent elections show, they still have most legitimacy among public in comparison with other opposition groups/”forces of change”:

  • “Khatami offered guidelines to escape the current crises, criticized the regime-changers, and did not attack the system but instead offered them a path. Khatami focused on ‘rebuilding public trust in public institutions” to escape the current crises.”
  • “It is said that people have moved past reformism and Khatami. This is true to an extent and reformists have lost votes … However, there are other issues to consider. For example, look at the situation of the ‘forces of change’ in the present time and compare them and see who is trustworthy: the Rajavists [MEK], the Shahis [Reza Pahlavi supporters], the Mesbahis [support of a fundamentalist cleric], the Shireen Ebadis, or the Khatamis. The situation for reformists in public opinion may not be good, but in comparison to other forces pushing for change, they have the most credibility.”
  • “Also, if Trump increases his threats, the positive but sleeping Iranian nationalism will be awoken and will increase participation in public life.”
  • “The regime changers slander every freedom-seeking person who has striven for change inside Iran. Their slanders have not only been aimed at Khatami or Mostafa Tajzadeh, but even Ebrahim Yazdi and Amir Entezami.”

Former hardline President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad releases video calling for Rouhani’s resignation and blaming the whole political system for the protests:

  • Ahmadinejad: “The people are totally discontent. They don’t accept the [Rouhani] administration. They don’t accept the other government institutions either.”
  • “The best way for Rouhani to gain approval is to no longer continue [as president].”
  • “The economy is on the verge of collapse. Public trust in the entire system is almost zero. Discontent has reached a peak. Poverty is widespread. Who is responsible for this? All officials. All three branches. More than anyone Rouhani.”
  • “Rouhani gave massive concession and got nothing” in his nuclear negotiations.
  • Threatens Rouhani: “For you to stay will be harmful both to the country and to you yourself.”

Raja News, far-right/hardline outlet issues a warning to the parliament: the start of new negotiations with the U.S. would be the “last bullet” for Rouhani’s qualification to be president. Negotiations with Trump would “mean this administration has no ability to manage the country’s affairs.” Link.  

Article in reformist Shargh by former member of National Front (Mossadegh’s party). Says Iran cannot rely much on Russia or China and must convince Europeans to come out stronger against the US. So unlike Kayhan, this piece argues that Iran should have more reliance on Europe. Link.

  • “Some groups in Iran stand alongside Israel’s lobbies and U.S. Republicans in their desire for the defeat of the JCPOA.”
  • “What Russia and China are up to is clear, in this threatening environment, they are using the Iran card to maximize the economic and even diplomatic concessions they can get from the West. We shouldn’t rely on them, but the EU on the other hand has certain capabilities.”

Article in Etemad Daily, close to Green Movement Leader Mehdi Karroubi. Author Farid Marjaee says in reaction to Trump’s offer of unconditional negotiations:

  • Before the start of any negotiations Trump must make his position on Pompeo’s 12 conditions clear. If Iran must accept these conditions what is the point of negotiations? Especially because Pompeo declared that Iran should satisfy some conditions after Trump’s offer of unconditional negotiation.
  • Trump must go back to JCPOA and start negotiations from there. The JCPOA was an international agreement accepted by all powers.

Revolutionary Guards commander Mohammad Ali Jafari wrote a letter to Trump responding to his offer for a meeting with Rouhani without conditions. The letter was provocative and ruled out any possibility for negotiations. Link.

  • “Mr. Trump, Iran is North Korea to give you a positive response to your desire for negotiations. You should know the Iranian people’s religion and faith was revived by Islam and nurtured by Imam Khomeini and they have many differences with hegemonic nations and will never allow their officials to negotiate with the Great Satan.”
  • “You are a president that is unprofessional in politics … previous presidents whether from military or political backgrounds who knew more than you or learned that Iran and Iranians are not susceptible to threats and would unite and become one in the face of any foreign threat or pressure.”
  • “You should ask your specialists and experts with experience and who are impartial whether they accept your games or whether they believe in the conclusion that you expect? Our revelatory and secret intelligence shows they do not.”
  • “You will take your desire that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s officials will want to negotiate with you or that they will get permission from the Iranian people to negotiate with you. You will never see this day. Sit in your black palace [means the White House] and stay there with your delusions about negotiating with Iran and know that this wish will not only stay with you until the end of your presidency but will be unfulfilled for future American presidents as well.”

 
August 6, 2018 Comments are off NIAC Staff
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Memo: Consequences of Sanctions Snapback on Iran

Not satisfied with withdrawing from the Iran nuclear accord, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (“JCPOA”), the Trump administration intends to start sanctioning foreign parties that seek to comply with the terms of the international agreement. As outlined by the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), the Trump administration will begin re-imposing those sanctions lifted pursuant to the JCPOA on August 7, 2018 and continuing up until November 4, 2018, at which time all formerly lifted sanctions will be re-imposed on Iran.

Because such U.S. sanctions primarily target foreign parties transacting or otherwise dealing with Iran, the Trump administration will be actively undermining efforts by the international community to act consistent with the JCPOA and ensure its survivability. This includes, most dramatically, undermining efforts by foreign countries and entities to take those measures identified in the JCPOA to reduce or eliminate the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran. This move is a dangerous gambit that pits the U.S. in opposition to the rest of the world—including the U.S.’s closest partners and allies—and risks re-invigorating nuclear proliferation efforts in Iran.

Considering the dramatic consequences for U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, the Trump administration should not be given free reign to plunge the United States into a confrontation with its closest allies and partners — such as those in Europe — and risk a new war in the Middle East. Congress should assert its own constitutional prerogatives and ensure that the Trump administration acts consistent with long-standing U.S. policy objectives, including those related to nuclear non-proliferation. This could include, for instance, legislative measures to restrain the Trump administration from abrogating the JCPOA or sanctioning foreign parties seeking to comply with the terms of the nuclear accord. At the very least, Congress should hold hearings to adjudicate the potential negative consequences of the Trump administration’s decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and undo the global consensus in favor of the diplomatic agreement aimed at restraining Iran’s nuclear program.

Re-Imposition of U.S. Sanctions Lifted Under the JCPOA

Beginning August 7, 2018, the Trump administration will take steps to re-impose those U.S. sanctions lifted pursuant to the JCPOA. In its initial phase, this will include the immediate re-imposition of sanctions on:

  • The purchase or acquisition of U.S. dollar banknotes by the Government of Iran;
  • Iran’s trade in gold or precious metals;
  • The direct or indirect sale, supply, or transfer to or from Iran of graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes;
  • Significant transactions related to the purchase or sale of Iranian rials or the maintenance of significant funds or accounts outside the territory of Iran denominated in the rial;
  • The purchase, subscription to, or facilitation of the issuance of Iranian sovereign debt; and
  • Iran’s automotive sector.

By November 4, 2018, the United States will re-impose all remaining sanctions targeting Iran that had been lifted pursuant to U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. This will include the re-imposition of sanctions on:

  • Iran’s port operators and shipping and shipbuilding sectors;
  • Petroleum-related transactions with the National Iranian Oil Company, Naftiran Intertrade Company, and the National Iranian Tanker Company, including the purchase of petroleum, petroleum products, and petrochemical products from Iran;
  • Transactions by foreign financial institutions with the Central Bank of Iran and designated Iranian financial institutions;
  • The provision of specialized financial messaging services to the Central Bank of Iran and certain Iranian financial institutions;
  • The provision of underwriting services, insurance, or reinsurance; and
  • Iran’s energy sector.

In addition, the Trump administration intends to re-impose those sanctions that applied to persons removed from OFAC’s List of Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN List”) and other U.S. sanctions lists pursuant to U.S. commitments under the JCPOA. This includes, for instance, the re-imposition of sanctions on most of Iran’s financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran.

Undermining International Compliance with a Successful Nonproliferation Agreement

The re-imposition of U.S. sanctions will pose immense difficulties for other major world powers’ compliance with the terms of the JCPOA.  Failure by the remaining JCPOA participants to fulfill the terms of the nuclear accord will prompt Iran to abandon some or all of the JCPOA’s limitations on its nuclear program, thus risking renewed proliferation efforts in Iran and threatening a new war in the Middle East.   

Pursuant to the JCPOA, major world powers — including Europe, Russia, and China — agreed to take steps to ensure effectiveness relating to the lifting of national and international sanctions. These commitments were geared towards ensuring that Iran received practical economic benefit from its agreement to maintain long-term restrictions on its own nuclear program. The JCPOA obligated all parties to take adequate measures “to ensure . . . effectiveness with respect to the lifting of sanctions under th[e] JCPOA” and committed JCPOA participants to “agree on steps to ensure Iran’s access in areas of trade, technology, finance, and energy.” The JCPOA was envisioned as an effective quid pro quo, whereby Iran agreed to long-term limitations on its nuclear program in return for practical economic benefits — including the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions — from major world powers.  

The re-imposition of U.S. sanctions, however, will risk the compliance of remaining JCPOA participants, as Europe and other JCPOA parties will have grave difficulties ensuring “effectiveness” with respect to the lifting of sanctions under the JCPOA. For instance, while the European Union and its respective states intend to continue the lifting of national and Union-wide sanctions targeting Iran–consistent with the JCPOA–European companies and persons will nonetheless remain subject to U.S. secondary sanctions targeting their own transactions or dealings with Iran.

The most notable consequences in this respect will be oil and banking transactions. To the extent that Iran is unable to export its oil and repatriate its oil revenues, the JCPOA will become a moot agreement, as Iran is highly unlikely to continue its adherence to limitations on its nuclear program while deriving no practical economic benefit from the nuclear accord. Re-imposed U.S. sanctions expressly target foreign banks — including foreign central banks — and foreign parties engaged in transactions related to the import of Iranian-origin oil. The Trump administration has sent conflicting signals as to whether it will grant exemptions to foreign countries importing Iranian-origin oil — including China, Europe, India, Japan, and South Korea. Similarly, to the extent that Iran’s financial institutions are isolated from the global financial system and unable to reconnect to foreign banks to process trade-related and other transactions, the Iran nuclear deal will not survive. Re-imposed U.S. sanctions will re-designate most Iranian financial institutions for sanctions and render foreign bank dealings with such Iranian financial institutions as sanctionable, thus expressly targeting foreign countries’ compliance with the nuclear accord.

Sanctioning Beneficial Work at Arak and Fordow

Pursuant to the JCPOA, Iran agreed to convert its enrichment facility at Fordow into a research center absent of proliferation risk. To do so, however, Iran required international collaboration, including in the form of scientific joint partnerships in agreed areas of research. In addition, the JCPOA required Iran — as part of an international partnership — to redesign and rebuild a modernized heavy-water reactor in Arak that would drastically reduce its potential output of plutonium.

However, these measures aimed at reducing the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran are under serious threat, as re-imposed U.S. sanctions render sanctionable conduct by foreign parties with respect to Iran’s nuclear program. For instance, the Trump administration has stated that it will re-impose those sanctions that applied to persons removed from OFAC’s SDN List pursuant to the JCPOA. This appears to include the re-designation of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (“AEOI”) — the body responsible for Iran’s nuclear program — pursuant to Executive Order 13382. By designating the AEOI pursuant to E.O. 13382, entities that provide or attempt to provide financial, material, technological, or other support for, or goods or services in support of, the AEOI would be exposed to U.S. sanctions and risk designation under E.O. 13382 themselves. Foreign parties participating in an international partnership with the AEOI — consistent with the JCPOA — to convert the Arak nuclear reactor into a reactor absent of proliferation risk would thus be engaged in sanctionable conduct, as such parties would be prima facie engaged in the provision of material support to the AEOI  — thus meeting the criteria for designation under E.O. 13382.  

In addition, the U.S.’s re-designation of the AEOI pursuant to E.O. 13382 will render foreign financial institutions that facilitate significant transactions for or on behalf of the AEOI — including transactions consistent with the terms of the JCPOA — exposed to U.S. sanctions under § 104(c)(2)(E) of the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act (“CISADA”) and § 1247 of the Iran Freedom and Counter-proliferation Act (“IFCA”). Such financial institutions would risk being cut off from the U.S. financial system and would thus be unlikely to facilitate transactions involving the AEOI, even if such transactions are consistent with the JCPOA and reduce the risk of proliferation in Iran.  

In the Trump administration’s zeal to kill the Iran nuclear deal, the administration will perhaps fatally undermine efforts to ensure the conversion of Iran’s nuclear facilities into facilities absent of proliferation risk, thus gravely undermining U.S. and regional security.

The Need for Congressional Intervention

The Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and its re-imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting Iran risks splitting the United States irrevocably from its historical allies and partners, including those in Europe; threatens to undermine the future use of economic sanctions to secure national security and foreign policy objectives; and encourages the reinvigoration of nuclear proliferation risks in Iran. Such consequences implicate critical U.S. national security and foreign policy interests and warrant increased oversight over the administration’s actions.

Congress should be involved in any decision implicating U.S. national security and foreign policy interests. In this case, Congress should assert its own prerogatives in the realm of foreign policy and resume U.S. compliance with the JCPOA, including, but not limited to, the continued lifting of U.S. sanctions as obligated under the nuclear accord. Absent such a dramatic measure, however, Congress should seek to restrain the President from re-imposing those U.S. sanctions lifted under the JCPOA and should at least limit the damage re-imposed U.S. sanctions could cause to the transatlantic alliance between the United States and Europe. If the U.S.’s historical allies and partners in Europe believe that their own national security interests demand their continued compliance with the JCPOA, then the Trump administration should be restricted from imposing sanctions on European companies engaged in commercial trade with Iran that is permissible under European law.

Shockingly, Congress — which held numerous hearings on the U.S.’s assent to the JCPOA — has proven unwilling to conduct significant oversight regarding the potential consequences inherent in the Trump administration’s withdrawal from the JCPOA and its re-imposition of U.S. sanctions targeting Iran. In failing to assess the risks and dangers associated with the Trump administration’s actions, Congress has rendered itself incapacitated on an issue of critical import to U.S. national security. Following midterm elections, Congress should reassert its prerogatives in the field of national security and ensure that the Trump administration is not able to undermine long-standing U.S. foreign policy objectives — including the objective of nuclear non-proliferation — through its rash decision to withdraw from the Iran nuclear accord and re-impose those U.S. sanctions lifted under the JCPOA.

¹ Other U.S. sanctions may be applicable to transactions involving the AEOI and incident to the fulfillment of the terms of the JCPOA, including, for instance, menu-based sanctions on foreign parties that sell, supply, or transfer to Iran graphite, raw, or semi-finished metals such as aluminum and steel, coal, and software for integrating industrial processes, if the material is sold, supplied, or transferred for use in connection with Iran’s nuclear program. Section 1245(a)(1)(C) of IFCA does not distinguish between those transactions aimed at converting Iran’s nuclear facilities into facilities absent of nuclear proliferation risk and is thus likely to counteract international efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation in Iran.  

July 20, 2018 Comments are off NIAC Staff
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Stephen Kinzer on Trump’s Iran Policies

We asked Stephen Kinzer, national best-selling author of All The Shah’s Men, about his thoughts on Trump and Pompeo’s Iran policies. Watch what he said below.

Kinzer doesn’t believe that the Trump administration has Iran’s best interests in mind, and neither do we. That’s why we’ve written an open letter, and we’d like you to add your name to it. Read an excerpt of the letter below:

“Iran’s only chance to achieve a sustainable democracy that reflects the wishes of its people comes from a process driven by the people of Iran, for the people of Iran. In short, change must come from inside of Iran – not from Washington or anywhere else. It is also crucial to bear in mind that Iranians have a long history with the United States, one that is alive in the memory of even young Iranians, and would compel them to respond to any American destabilisation with wariness and hostility.  However, efforts to bring about the collapse of the Iranian economy through external pressures and sanctions, or a US-sponsored regime change in Iran (in the image of Iraq) will not bring about democracy in Iran but rather destabilize the country and put democracy out of the reach of the Iranian people. That is what it did in Iraq, where after a decade of devastating instability with more than 500,000 dead, Iraq holds elections but is far from a democracy that reflects the hopes and aspirations of its people.”

Read more and sign our open letter here.

July 16, 2018 Comments are off NIAC Staff
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Pompeo and Trump Plan to Exploit and Silence Iranian Americans

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Contact: Jamal Abdi
Phone: 202-386-6408
Email: jabdi@niacouncil.org

Washington, D.C. – Jamal Abdi, the Vice President for Policy of the National Iranian American Council, issued the following statement in response to Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s announcement that he will address Iranian Americans in Simi Valley later this month:

“The quest for human rights and democracy in Iran can only be owned by the Iranian people. It cannot be owned by the U.S., Israel, or Saudi Arabia. It cannot be decided by Iran’s government or even Iranian exiles.

“What President Trump and Secretary Pompeo want is to exploit Iranian Americans and co-opt the Iranian people to provide legitimacy for the Trump Administration’s Iraq War redux for Iran. Just as the Bush Administration cultivated a few Iraqi exiles and talked about human rights to provide legitimacy for a disastrous invasion of Iraq, the Trump Administration appears intent on using Iranian exiles to advance dangerous policies that will leave the Iranian people as its primary victims.

“If Sec. Pompeo really wants the Iranian-American community to embrace the Trump agenda, he must start with a sincere apology and rescind Trump’s ban that is dividing Iranian Americans from their friends and loved ones in Iran. He should apologize for the Administration’s move to banish the most prominent Iranian-American national security official from policymaking decisions due to her heritage. Moreover, he should apologize for the decision to strip the Iranian people of their hope for relief from sanctions and greater connections with the outside world, instead ensuring they will be crushed between U.S. sanctions and resurgent hardline forces in Iran’s government that have benefited from Trump’s withdrawal from the nuclear accord.

“It should be abundantly clear that Secretary Pompeo, who called for bombing Iran instead of negotiations, is no friend of the Iranian people. Similarly, Trump – whose national security advisor and lawyer have elevated the voices of an undemocratic, human rights abusing cult, the MEK, to become the next leadership of Iran – does not have the Iranian people’s best interests at heart. The Trump Administration’s close coordination with Benjamin Netanyahu and Mohammad Bin Salman, who are motivated by their own political gain and regional power dynamics rather than any love for democracy or the Iranian people, should dispel any notion this campaign is about helping ordinary Iranians.

“As Americans, we have a vital role to play in ensuring our democratically elected government does not start wars on false pretenses or destroy lives in our names. As Iranian Americans, our voices are particularly vital when it comes to the U.S. government’s efforts regarding our ancestral homeland. We will not be exploited or silenced at this critical moment in history.”

###

June 8, 2018 Comments are off Omeed Askary
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Iran Hawk Accuses Lawmaker of Supporting Iranian Repression During Hearing

WASHINGTON, DC – “It’s imperative that the administration change its direction and work with Congress, along with our European partners, to mitigate the very destabilizing consequences of our withdrawal from the Iran nuclear agreement,” declared Ranking Congressman Peter Welch (D-VT). On June 6, 2018, the Subcommittee of National Security of the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform met to discuss the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Rep. Welch put hawkish witnesses on the defensive regarding U.S. options after the collapse of the JCPOA, noting the increased risk that the U.S. will be backed into supporting war and regime change. This led to a shocking moment where one panelist accused him of acquiescing in the repression and torture of citizens by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

When pressed by the Chairman of the subcommittee, Rep. Ron DeSantis (R-FL), on whether the US was pushing toward war with its goal of regime change, Senior Advisor at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Richard Goldberg dismissed the notion. He claimed that no official “on this panel and certainly in the administration…is coming anywhere near such a policy [of direct military engagement].”

Congressman Welch then asked if statements made by National Security Advisor John Bolton and President Trump’s attorney Rudy Giuliani, who have both been clear in their desire for U.S.-backed regime change in Iran, should be dismissed. He asked Goldberg, “[John Bolton]’s the national security adviser for the president, he said to the American people that our goal should be regime change in Iran. Now you just want to blow him away and say that he didn’t mean it?”

Goldberg pushed on and suddenly accused the congressman of condoning the Iranian regime’s violations of human rights, asking Rep. Welch, “Congressman, are you for repression of the Iranian people, yes or no?” In an incredibly disparaging action towards the congressman, he immediately charged, “Are you for the repression and torture of [Iranians]?”

“There is no one in this Congress, no one in this country, that condones repression anywhere by any dictator in any country, and you know that. I’m asking the questions here,” Welch replied, taken aback by the wild accusation.

Congressman Welch pressed on in questioning the panelists on the Trump Administration’s policy if Iran were to aggressively ramp up its nuclear activities. He posited, “Let me ask this question, what’s the option for the United States, should Iran aggressively restart its activities towards building a nuclear weapon? Who on the panel would favor the use of military action at that point? Just raise your hands.”

David Albright, President for the Institute for Science and International Security, replied “Absolutely,” and Michael Pregent, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute, proceeded to raise his hand in favor of future military force against Iran. Dr. Michael Rubin, resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute who pushed for the 2003 invasion of Iraq and military action against Iran in the past, said: “There’s episodes of overwhelming pressure that has caused Iran to back down…I’ll let history be the precedent on this, Mr. Ranking Member.”

When Congressman Welch pressed the panelists on post-JCPOA policy recommendations, the sole JCPOA supporter on the panel – Jim Walsh, Senior Research Associate in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Security Studies Program – declared, “We don’t have a strategy and that this puts on a path to war, either by design – regime change – or we back into it as we respond to them a bit – beginning to reinstall their nuclear program.”

The ‘support for the Iranian people’ that Secretary of State Pompeo claims is the Trump Administration’s position was critiqued by Walsh, who stated: “On this issue of the Iranians whom everyone professes such great concern for…the Iranian people are not happy with us – Muslim ban, number one.”

Any military confrontation with Iran will not only embolden hardliners within the country, but will inevitably result in Iranian civilians actively resisting any foreign military aggression, Walsh continued. “A [private] poll came out last month that…asked the Iranian people… ‘How should we respond to the U.S pulling out?’” Walsh noted. “67 percent of Iranians said that Iran should retaliate. Why? Because they’re rallying around their flag.”

Walsh reiterated the fact that if Iran is attacked militarily by the United States, such an attack would damage U.S credibility in the eyes of Iranians. Any direct military strike by the Trump Administration is counterproductive to U.S. interests and only further alienates the Iranian people from any favorable view of America’s agenda in the region. As Dr. Walsh explained, “They may not like the corruption. They may not like the economy. But if you threaten to attack their country, we’re going to help the hardliners. We’re not going to strike a blow for democracy.”

May 25, 2018 Comments are off Armin Fakhrai
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Pompeo Pressed on Iran before Senate Committee

“The Saudis and their allies, the Gulf Sheikdoms, spend eight times more (militarily) than Iran,” noted Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY) in a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing Thursday. “So when you tell Iran, you have to give up your ballistic missile program but you don’t say anything to the Saudis, you think they’re ever going to sign that?”

Sen. Paul was questioning Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on the Trump Administration’s twelve demands of Iran, which many interpreted as a fanciful wish list rather than the comprehensive strategy the administration billed it as. Paul noted the hypocrisy of the demands as the U.S. was not asking any of its own partners in the region to sign up for them. Regarding Pompeo’s demand that Iran reveal the military dimensions of its nuclear program, Paul said “Let’s substitute Israel for Iran there. Does anybody think that Israel’s going to reveal the military dimensions of their nuclear program?”

Regarding the demand for Iran to withdraw all its forces from Syria, Paul asserted that Saudi Arabia and Qatar have funded ISIS and stated, “So if you want Iran to stop — I mean Saudi Arabia and Qatar are 10 times the problem, you know, the whole Syrian war has all of these radical jihadists, the people who attacked us came from Saudi Arabia.”

Pompeo was also pressed on the administration’s rhetorical support for the Iranian people who are still subject to Trump’s Muslim ban.

“One of the lines of effort you mentioned included supporting the Iranian people, which I was intrigued by,” noted Sen. Chris Coons of Delaware. “Are you advocating that President Trump remove Iran from the list of countries whose citizens can’t come to the United States through the travel ban? And help me with whether the Trump administration visa policy is consistent with outreach to the Iranian people?”

Pompeo did not answer directly, indicating that “there are many pieces of this that I will concede we still have work to do to figure out.” However, Pompeo asserted that the Iranian people, who the Secretary helps ensure can’t obtain a visa under the ban, “won’t be on their own.” Yet, until the administration rescinds the ban, its rhetorical support for the Iranian people will ring utterly hollow.

Pompeo was also pressed by Senator Udall and others on the committee regarding his views of the administration’s war power authorities on Iran. In response to Sen. Udall’s question on whether the President has the authority to wage war against Iranian militias under either the 2001 or 2002 authorizations to use military force – targeting al-Qaeda and Iraq, respectively – Pompeo said that he did not know. Earlier in the day, the House of Representatives passed a key defense bill asserting that the Congress has not authorized the use of military forces against Iran under any act.

April 30, 2018 Comments are off Ryan Costello
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Kicking the Hornet’s Nest: Consequences of Trump’s May 12 Iran Deal Decision

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President Trump has threatened to put the U.S. into material breach of the Iran nuclear deal, also known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), by failing to renew nuclear sanctions waivers by the May 12 deadline. As a result, it is necessary for policymakers to think clearly regarding the consequences of a U.S. material breach of the accord, including the collapse of the JCPOA, Iranian nuclear expansion, diminished U.S. influence with its allies, and a growing threat of war under Trump and his hawkish advisors.

Immediate Breach of the Accord

If the President refuses to waive sanctions on May 12, nuclear-related sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran passed via Section 1245 of the FY2012 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would snap back into place, resulting in an immediate material breach of the JCPOA. Under this provision, countries must reduce their oil purchases from Iran or the U.S. will cut off that country’s financial institutions that transact with Iranian banks from the American economy. This would not reimpose all of the sanctions that the U.S. is obligated to waive – the next sanctions waiver deadline is 60 days later and pertains to the vast majority of nuclear-related sanctions. But by targeting both oil sales and banking, driving down oil sales and forcing companies to withdraw from the Iranian market, the U.S. would not just violate the agreement but would be unravelling the core of Iran’s incentives to remain compliant with the terms of the JCPOA.

Even if the administration seeks to dull the initial impact by delaying enforcement, as some have suggested may be its plan, the failure to waive will result in a material breach of the agreement. The text of the JCPOA also makes clear that a failure to waive sanctions on May 12 would result in an immediate breach. The U.S. is obligated to “cease the application” of  nuclear-related sanctions including the Central Bank sanctions contained in Section 1245 of the FY12 NDAA. Moreover, the U.S. has committed to “refrain from re-introducing or re-imposing the sanctions” lifted under the deal, while the JCPOA indicates Iran will treat such re-imposition “as grounds to cease performing its commitments under this JCPOA in whole or in part.” As former administration officials Rob Malley and Colin Kahl recently wrote, “in the absence of Iranian violations of the deal, the United States would be in material breach of the agreement the moment Trump refuses to waive U.S. sanctions, even as the deal’s other signatories remain party to it.”

The Trump administration has already violated the JCPOA repeatedly by any objective measure, including by actively warning foreign companies against doing any business in Iran, refusing to issue licenses for the sale of aircraft to Iran and holding U.S. implementation of the accord in doubt. While these violations have been serious, they have not struck directly at the core of the bargain. Reinstating oil sanctions would be a direct attack on the core benefit and put the U.S. in material breach.

Death of the Deal

Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has indicated that if the U.S. withdraws from the accord, Iran will do the same. The JCPOA includes a dispute resolution mechanism wherein Iran would be able to file an official complaint regarding U.S. failure to meet its sanctions-lifting obligations, a forum where the U.S. would be isolated following a U.S. breach. If Trump refused to correct the breach, Iran “could treat the unresolved issue as grounds to cease performing its commitments, in whole or in part, and/or notify the UN Security Council that it believes the issue constitutes significant non-performance,” according to the text of the agreement. In other words, Iran would have sufficient grounds to orchestrate a withdrawal from its JCPOA obligations while pinning the blame on the United States.

Other Iranian officials have suggested that Iran will resume many of its nuclear activities that deeply concerned the international community prior to the JCPOA. While it is unclear precisely how far Iran would go, Iran could:

  • Bring advanced centrifuges online or resume enrichment at the deeply-buried Fordow nuclear site;
  • Begin enriching uranium beyond 3.67%, potentially up to 20% or higher;
  • Expand beyond 300 kg of enriched uranium to sufficient quantities for multiple nuclear weapons with further enrichment;
  • Limit International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector access, including access to suspect undeclared sites, uranium mines and mills and centrifuge production facilities.

Iranian officials have also suggested that their commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty – the foundation of the non-proliferation regime – could be jeopardized by a JCPOA withdrawal. While that would be an extreme measure that could ratchet up tensions significantly, the possibility cannot be ruled out in the event of a shocking unilateral U.S. rupture of a carefully-crafted diplomatic agreement that was narrowly secured against the opposition of many hardline interests in Tehran..

Isolated from Allies

It is no coincidence that both French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to Washington the same week, shortly before the May 12 deadline, to speak with Trump about the JCPOA. America’s European allies are extremely concerned that Trump will follow through and terminate a deal that is in the best interests of the transatlantic relationship, global security and the nonproliferation regime, with devastating results.

Macron has made clear that he is willing to work with Trump to address issues outside the scope of the JCPOA, including Iran’s missile program and regional security issues such as Syria, as part of a “grand bargain.” There are numerous uncertainties regarding Macron’s approach – after all, Iran would likely be unwilling to engage on a new deal when the U.S. has failed to implement the JCPOA. However, it is also clear that the U.S. would forfeit such coordination with its allies if the foundation of the JCPOA is terminated by a unilateral U.S. withdrawal, as Macron warned is still the most likely outcome.

As more than 500 members of the United Kingdom, French and German parliaments recently warned in an unprecedented letter to the U.S. Congress, “if the deal breaks down, it will well-nigh be impossible to assemble another grand coalition built around sanctions against Iran. We must preserve what took us a decade to achieve and has proven to be effective.” Absent the leverage provided by close cooperation with our allies, there is no chance for a “better deal,” and serious risks that there would be no deal after the JCPOA whatsoever.

If Trump follows through and terminates the JCPOA, the U.S. will be put in the difficult position of threatening sanctions on the foremost companies of many friendly countries – including those in Europe, South Korea, India and beyond. This could result in a trade war if those countries take actions to protect their companies from U.S. sanctions enforcement. Moreover, as former Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew warned in 2016, “if foreign jurisdictions and companies feel that we will deploy sanctions without sufficient justification or for inappropriate reasons—secondary sanctions in particular—we should not be surprised if they look for ways to avoid doing business in the United States or in U.S. dollars.”

Another War of Choice    

The elevation of John Bolton to National Security Advisor and Mike Pompeo to Secretary of State ensures that at least two individuals who prefer an Iran war to Iran diplomacy will be advising Trump on the JCPOA and broader Iran policy. Moreover, Trump himself has previewed his hawkish inclinations, warning that if Iran restarts their nuclear program “they will have bigger problems than they ever had before” and “if Iran threatens us in any way, they will pay a price like few countries have ever paid.” In unraveling the nuclear accord and freeing Iran to resume their nuclear activities, Trump would be triggering the very situation where he strongly hinted that he would use military force.

Amid an already ruinous regional proxy war in the Middle East, a war against Iran could be even more disastrous for global security than the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Iran is nearly four times the size of Iraq, with influence in military conflicts from Syria to Yemen and with missiles capable of striking U.S. ships and bases in the region. Bombing cannot erase Iran’s nuclear know-how and would only empower those in Iran eager to obtain a nuclear deterrent. Moreover, it would set the region aflame and draw the U.S. into a prolonged quagmire that would cost American blood and treasure and set U.S. security back decades.

Congress can intervene to check Trump, including by clarifying that the administration does not have authorization to launch a war against Iran. Yet, the clock is quickly running out to save the JCPOA and prevent an escalation to war.

 

April 27, 2018 Comments are off Anya Raadam
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NIAC Pushes for Broader Sanctions Exemptions for Humanitarian Relief

Washington, DC – In response to Iran’s deadly 2017 earthquake in Kermanshah province, hundreds of thousands of U.S. citizens donated to humanitarian relief efforts to rebuild devastated areas. Humanitarian relief efforts have long been exempt from U.S. sanctions law, though in practice there continue to be sanctions-related hurdles both in how American citizens contribute to relief efforts and how humanitarian NGO’s are able to finance relief work on the ground. On numerous occasions, NIAC has raised concerns regarding these complications and pushed the administration to ensure that U.S. sanctions were not standing in the way of urgent relief. In November, Sen. Bernie Sanders (I-VT) and four other Senators led a letter urging the administration to broaden its sanctions exemptions to facilitate relief.

On March 22, the Department of Treasury solicited feedback on the effectiveness of its current licensing procedures for humanitarian aid to Iran and Sudan. Given the importance of this issue to both the people of Iran and the Iranian-American community, NIAC submitted comments recommending opportunities for improvements, including by encouraging the Treasury Department to authorize a direct banking channel between the U.S. and Iran to finance relief work. This is of critical importance, as we have heard directly from humanitarian organizations regarding the continued difficulty of finding banks willing to transact with them given the perceived risk of running afoul of U.S. sanctions.

We will continue to work to advance our recommendations and ensure that U.S. sanctions do not inadvertently impede humanitarian relief to the people of Iran. You can see the text of NIAC’s comment below:

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ATTN: Request for Comments (TSRA)
Office of Foreign Assets Control
United States Department of the Treasury
Freedman’s Bank Building
1500 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20220

Re: NIAC’s Comments Regarding OFAC’s TSRA Licensing Procedures

Dear Sir or Madam:

            On March 22, 2018, the United States Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”) announced that it was “soliciting comments on the effectiveness of OFAC’s licensing procedures for the exportation of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Sudan and Iran.”[1]  OFAC is required to solicit such comments as part of its biennial report to Congress on the operation of the licensing procedures pursuant to § 906 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (“TSRA”) and will consider any such comments during the development of its report to Congress.  

By means of this instant submission, the National Iranian American Council (“NIAC”), the largest grassroots organization in the United States representing the interests of Iranian Americans, submits its comments regarding the effectiveness of OFAC’s licensing procedures for the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran for the time period between October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016. NIAC submits such comments with the sole intent of encouraging the robust facilitation of humanitarian trade between the United States and Iran in order to benefit the Iranian people, as is the purpose of the underlying TSRA legislation.

  1. Factual Background

            The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (“TSRA”), 22 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq., terminates any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction in effect as of October 28, 2000 against a foreign country or foreign entity and prohibits the President from imposing any such unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction unless a proposed sanction is enacted into law by a joint resolution of the Congress.[2]  However, this provision does not direct the termination of, or prohibit the imposition of, any unilateral agricultural sanction or unilateral medical sanction that prohibits, restricts, or conditions the provision or use of any agricultural commodity, medicine, or medical device that is controlled on the United States Munitions List (“USML”), controlled on any control list established by the Export Administration Act of 1979 (“EAA”) or any successor statute, or used to facilitate the development or production of chemical or biological weapons or weapons of mass destruction.[3]

            Moreover, TSRA provides that the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Cuba or to any U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism shall only be made pursuant to one (1) year licenses issued by the U.S. government for contracts entered into during the one (1) year period of the license and shipped within the twelve (12) month period beginning on the date of the signing of the contract.[4]  OFAC applies the licensing procedures required by this latter provision to all exports and re-exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to U.S.-designated state sponsors of terrorism – including Iran and Sudan – that are within the current scope of OFAC’s licensing jurisdiction.[5]

            Iran remains a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism; and, as such, TSRA’s licensing procedures are applicable to the export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.  These licensing procedures are codified in the Iranian Transactions and Sanctions Regulations (“ITSR”), 31 C.F.R. Part 560.  Section 560.530 of the ITSR promulgates a general license and specific licensing procedure for the sale, export, and re-export to Iran of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices, while § 560.532 of the ITSR identifies authorized means of making payment for and financing any such licensed sales, exports, or re-exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran. 

  1. NIAC’s Comments Regarding OFAC’s TSRA Licensing Procedures

            The most significant impediment to U.S. person engagement in humanitarian trade with Iran remains the lack of a financial channel to remit payment for humanitarian goods.  Despite licensing the making of payments and financing for sales, exports, and re-exports of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran, OFAC’s licensing procedures have failed to provide U.S. persons with reliable options for receiving payment for the provision of permissible humanitarian items to Iran.  Unable to reliably receive payment for their provision of humanitarian goods to Iran or receive financing to permit the sale of such humanitarian items to Iran, a substantial number of U.S. persons that otherwise would have made use of OFAC’s licensing procedures for humanitarian trade with Iran have elected not to pursue such trade.  This undermines U.S. foreign policy interests vis-à-vis Iran, as well as the purposes underlying TSRA’s legislation, by enacting a de facto embargo on the sale, export, or re-export of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran. 

            Pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 560.532(a), OFAC provides general license authorization for the following payments terms for sales authorized under § 560.530(a)

(1)       Payment of cash in advance;

(2)       Sales on open account, provided that the account receivable may not be transferred to the person extending the credit;

(3)       Financing by third-country financial institutions that are not U.S. persons, entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons and established or maintained outside the United States, Iranian financial institutions, or the Government of Iran.  Such financing may be confirmed or advised by U.S. financial institutions and by financial institutions that are entities owned or controlled by U.S. persons and established or maintained outside the United States; or

(4)       Letter of credit issued by an Iranian financial institution whose property and interests in property are blocked solely pursuant to 31 C.F.R. Part 560. Such letter of credit must be initially advised, confirmed, or otherwise dealt in by a third-country financial institution that is not a U.S. person, an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the U.S., an Iranian financial institution, or the Government of Iran before it is advised, confirmed, or dealt in by a U.S. financial institution or a financial institution that is an entity owned or controlled by a U.S. person and established or maintained outside the United States. 

Section 560.532(c)(2) further states that “[n]othing in this section authorizes payment terms or trade financing involving debits or credits to Iranian accounts, as defined in § 560.320.” 

            OFAC’s licensing procedures prohibit direct interaction between U.S. and Iranian financial institutions, as evidenced above.  Indeed, OFAC itself has stated that “it is contrary to U.S. foreign policy to allow U.S. financial institutions to maintain active correspondent relationships with Iranian banks.”  As a result, any financing for or receipt of payment from the licensed export of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran must involve a third-country financial institution prior to the involvement of a U.S. financial institution, and U.S. person engagement in humanitarian trade involving Iran is contingent on the willingness of third-country financial institutions to issue letters of credit or otherwise process transactions involving the export or re-export of agricultural commodities, medicine, or medical devices from the United States or by a U.S. person, wherever located, to Iran.

            Unfortunately, OFAC has ample precedent at this time demonstrating that third-country financial institutions are generally unwilling to aid U.S. persons seeking to engage in humanitarian trade with Iran authorized pursuant to 31 C.F.R. § 560.530(a).  As a result, U.S. persons have not taken advantage of the permitted trade openings to the extent that would otherwise be possible if there were a reliable, authorized financial channel to remit funds from Iran to the United States.  OFAC has been presented with numerous options to resolve this ongoing problem, including, but not limited to, a direct financial channel between the United States and Iran for licensed dealings between the two countries.  For reasons that remain unclear, OFAC has chosen not to pursue these solutions and has persisted with an authorization that fails to produce the desired outcome.

            It is NIAC’s hope that OFAC will revisit its licensing procedures, including, most especially, its authorization for making payments and financing for the export and re-export of agricultural commodities, medicines, and medical devices to Iran, and will broaden the scope of current license authorizations to ensure that U.S. persons are able to timely and reliably receive payment and financing for humanitarian trade with Iran.

            III.      Conclusion

            NIAC submits this comment pursuant to OFAC’s March 22, 2018 Request for Comment and hopes that the agency will consider this feedback concerning its TSRA licensing procedures.  It is our considered view that while the agency has made important progress expanding the scope of license authorizations relating to the sale, export, and re-export of agricultural commodities, medicine, and medical devices to Iran – including by broadening the scope of medical devices that are generally authorized for export or re-export to Iran – OFAC should ensure that these license authorizations can be fully utilized by ensuring reliable options exist for making payments for and financing the export of such humanitarian items.  For the reasons explained above, NIAC believes that OFAC’s license authorizations have been under-utilized as a result of the lack of a reliable financial channel to facilitate payments for humanitarian items, and only new solutions – including, for example, a direct financial channel between the United States and Iran – can ease this ongoing problem for U.S. exporters and re-exporters.

[1]Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for Exportation of Agricultural Commodities, Medicine, and Medical Devices to Sudan and Iran; Comment Request, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 83 Fed. Reg.12513, March 22, 2018, available athttps://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2018-03-22/pdf/2018-05638.pdf.

[2]See 22 U.S.C. § 7201 et seq.

[3]Resource Center: Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) Program, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, January 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/tsra_info.aspx. See also22 U.S.C. § 7203.

[4]22 U.S.C. § 7205.

[5]Resource Center: Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) Program, U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, January 13, 2017, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/programs/pages/tsra_info.aspx.