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Washington DC - "In this country there is an overwhelming tendency to dismiss the activities of the IAEA," declared Bruno Pellaud, President of the Swiss Nuclear Forum and advisor on nuclear security and non-proliferation to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Citing the organization's reliance on satellite surveillance, underground uranium dust detectors, and British/US intelligence, Pellaud concluded, "IAEA now has the power to provide a degree of assurances to the international community [with respect to Iran]."

In his former capacity as the Deputy Director General of the IAEA in Vienna, Pellaud, who was joined by Professor Maurizio Martellini, a nuclear scientist and advisor to the Italian government, referenced Iran's chief negotiator, Ali Larijani's declaration in Munich last Sunday that Iran was ready to negotiate the nuclear issue and Tehran's technical difficulties in advancing its program as a sign that there is room to find accommodation."The Iranian nuclear program is in bad shape," stated Pellaud.

The panelists, joined by Joe Cirincione, senior Vice-President of national security at the Center for American Progress, began a lengthy discussion over the utility of US diplomatic options with Iran, as part of a full day conference on Capitol Hill, co-sponsored by NIAC and the New American Foundation.

Concurring with Pellaud, Martellini advocated a step-by step incremental approach that would address Iran's economic and security concerns and would guarantee a secure supply of enriched uranium from outside Iran.

Questions about Iran's ostensive nuclear weapons program were addressed by Pellaud, who cited John Negroponte, Director of US National Intelligence and the IAEA's "declarations that there is at present no evidence of a weapons program in Iran."

Pellaud further defended the idea that a compromise that would enable Iran to have a limited enrichment capability was virtually proliferation safe. He cited a number of eminent American nuclear scientists who in 2005 had written that "a small number of centrifuges [in Iran] is a zero risk option and of no great strategic importance."

Joe Cirincione, who moderated the discussion, pressed Pellaud on his assertion when he asked "you said there is no evidence in Iran of a weapons program, surely you don't mean that. Do you mean that there is no proof?"

The former deputy director of safeguards at the IAEA pointed out that "since 2003, Iran has been under strict control," and that inspections and safeguards are a stronger non-proliferation tool than suspension of enrichment.

Citing his optimism over a negotiated settlement with Iran, Martellini outlined a four step model of negotiations with Iran that included an international consortium that would provide Iran and surrounding Arab countries with political and economic incentives including "a secured supply of enriched fuel."

The discussion concluded when Cirincione asked "suppose Iran has a secret nuclear program. Can international inspections detect it?" "Our first priority for Iran is the reestablishment of the additional [IAEA] protocol that will give access to all Iranian facilities. If this occurs, this complementarity [between the IAEA and US intelligence] becomes very powerful," concluded Pellaud.